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Protecting the First Amendment Rights of
Video Games from Lanham Act and
Right of Publicity Claims
Yen-Shyang Tseng*

Abstract
In 2013 and 2015, the Ninth Circuit decided two nearly identical cases in
which professional football players alleged a video game publisher used their
likenesses without authorization in a game that simulates real football games.
One plaintiff brought a false endorsement claim under the Lanham Act, while
others brought state law right of publicity claims. That made all the
difference. The Ninth Circuit found the First Amendment protected the game
against the false endorsement claim, but not against the right of publicity
claims. These contradictory results stem from court’s application of
the Rogers v. Grimaldi test to Lanham Act claims and the transformative use
test to right of publicity claims. A review of both lines of precedent in the
video game context and a comparison of the cases with each other and to
cases involving traditional forms of expressive works reveal two problems
that must be addressed. First, many courts fail to view video games as
expressive works equal to books, television shows, and films, and instead view
them as products and merchandise like lithographs and t-shirts. Second, the
transformative use test suffers from subjectivity and fails to properly
recognize First Amendment protection over video games aiming for realism.
This article proposes resolving both problems by applying the Rogers test to
both Lanham Act and right of publicity claims.

* Appellate attorney at Horvitz & Levy LLP in Burbank, California. The opinions expressed in
this article are mine. My firm handles California and Ninth Circuit appeals and might have represented
parties or amici curiae in some cases discussed in this article, but I have not been involved in any such
cases. Thanks to the editors of the Pepperdine Law Review and to all friends of Purple Poring.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Lawsuits against video game publishers over the use of marks and
likenesses have proliferated with the recent meteoric growth of the video
game and esports industries.1 In just the past decade, Activision Blizzard
faced at least three lawsuits over its use of marks or likenesses in the Call of
Duty franchise.2 Meanwhile, Electronic Arts has faced numerous lawsuits
over its use of the likenesses of college and professional athletes’ likenesses
in Madden NFL and NCAA Football.3 More recently, Epic Games and TakeTwo have faced a flurry of cases over their use of dance moves in Fortnite
and NBA 2K.4 An analysis of Lanham Act and right of publicity cases in the
video game context reveals two problems. First, courts remain reluctant to
view video games as expressive works equal to traditional entertainment
media; instead, they view them as products and merchandise like lithographs
and t-shirts. Second, even when the facts are nearly identical, the results in
these cases can differ depending entirely on the legal theory alleged by a
plaintiff.
These problems stem in part from the different tests applied to Lanham
Act claims and right of publicity claims. In cases arising from the Lanham
Act, courts apply the Second Circuit’s Rogers v. Grimaldi test to balance the
plaintiff’s rights with the defendant’s First Amendment rights.5 The Rogers
test has upheld video game publishers’ First Amendment rights, leading to
Activision’s victories in the Call of Duty cases and EA’s win in one case
involving Madden NFL.6 By contrast, in right of publicity cases, courts apply
the transformative use test.7 And unlike the Rogers test, the transformative

1. See generally Yen-Shyang Tseng, The Principles of Esports Engagement: A Universal Code
of Conduct?, 27 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 209, 211–15 (2020) (discussing growth of video games and
esports).
2. See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., infra Sections III.D.3, IV.D.1–3.
4. See infra Section IV.V.3 (discussing lawsuits filed against Epic Games and Take-Two).
5. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d. Cir. 1989).
6. See Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding in favor of
Electronic Arts when applying the Rogers test); AM General, LLC v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 450 F.
Supp. 3d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (granting a motion for summary judgment and dismissing trademark
infringement claims after applying Lanham Act analysis); Mil-Spec Monkey, Inc. v. Activision
Blizzard, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1136 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (holding in favor of Activision based on
use of the Rogers test); Novalogic, Inc. v. Activision Blizzard, 41 F. Supp. 3d 885 , 898–901 (C.D.
Cal 2013) (holding in favor of Activision based on use of the Rogers test).
7. See infra Section IV.B.
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use test has failed to adequately respect the First Amendment, leading to
several of EA’s losses in cases involving Madden NFL and NCAA Football.8
Further, the subjectivity of the transformative use test has allowed courts to
make the inexplicable distinction between video games and other forms of
expressive works.
Commentators have acknowledged the problem arising from the courts
reaching inconsistent results.9 Several have advocated for greater protection
for trademark owners and individuals by importing the transformative use test
applied in right of publicity cases to Lanham Act cases.10 This article proposes
applying the Rogers test to both Lanham Act and right of publicity claims to
adequately protect the First Amendment rights of video games. Doing so
would satisfy the strict scrutiny analysis that should be applied to the right of
publicity as a content-based restriction on speech. And it would recognize
that video games are expressive works like books, television shows, and
films—not products or merchandise like lithographs and t-shirts. Yet at the
same time, it would properly protect both mark owners and individuals whose
marks or likenesses have been misappropriated for commercial use.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S PROTECTION OF ENTERTAINMENT
The First Amendment has long protected entertainment as a form of
expression. In 1948, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the First Amendment
protected magazines, finding “[t]he line between the informing and the
entertaining is too elusive for the protection of [a free press]. Everyone is
familiar with instances of propaganda through fiction. What is one man’s
amusement, teaches another’s doctrine.”11 Four years later, the Court
extended First Amendment protection to motion picture films, finding “[t]he
importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion is not lessened
by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform.”12 And in
the first and only right of publicity case the Court heard, it reiterated that
8. See, e.g., infra Sections IV.C.2., IV.D.1–3.
9. See, e.g., Arlen Papazian, Let’s Stop Play Games: A Consistent Test for Unlicensed Trademark
Use and the Right of Publicity in Video Games, 8 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 577, 592–96 (2017).
10. See id. at 596–603.
11. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948); see also Univ. of Notre Dame Du Lac v.
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 256 N.Y.S.2d 301, 307 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965) (holding the First
Amendment protects forms of expression even if they are only for entertainment), aff’d, 207 N.E.2d
508 (N.Y. 1965).
12. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).
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“[t]here is no doubt that entertainment, as well as news, enjoys First
Amendment protection.”13
The Court also made it clear that the First Amendment protects
entertainment even though entertainment is often created for profit: “That
books, newspapers, and magazines are published and sold for profit does not
prevent them from being a form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded
by the First Amendment. We fail to see why operation for profit should have
any different effect in the case of motion pictures.”14 Likewise, the California
Supreme Court held, “[w]hen expression protected by the First Amendment
is involved, ‘[i]t is of course no matter that the dissemination takes place under
commercial auspices.’”15 In the court’s seminal right of publicity decision in
1979, it reiterated that “[t]he First Amendment is not limited to those who
publish without charge. Whether the activity involves newspaper publication
or motion picture production, it does not lose its constitutional protection
because it is undertaken for profit.”16
Many decades later, in the era of lawsuits challenging regulations over
“violent” games, lower courts began to recognize the First Amendment’s
protection of video games.17 The Eighth Circuit saw “no reason why the
pictures, graphic design, concept art, sounds, music, stories, and narrative
present in video games are not entitled to a similar protection” as paintings,

13. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977).
14. Joseph Burstyn, Inc., 343 U.S. at 501–02; see also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 397 (1967)
(affirming the principle that an article being produced for trade purposes does not prevent it from being
considered a protected form of expression).
15. Weaver v. Jordan, 411 P.2d 289, 297 (Cal. 1966) (quoting Smith v. People of California, 361
U.S. 147, 150 (1959)).
16. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 459 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, J., concurring).
Chief Justice Bird’s concurrence was endorsed by three other justices and therefore “commanded the
support of the majority of the court.” Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797,
802–03, n.7 (Cal. 2001).
17. See, e.g., Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2009)
(holding a California legislative act seeking to limit sales of violent video games to minors was an
invalid infringement on First Amendment rights), aff’d sub nom, Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n,
564 U.S. 786 (2011); Interactive Dig. Software Ass’n v. St. Louis Cty., 329 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir.
2003) (upholding the First Amendment rights of violent video games against a law restricting sale of
these games to minors); James v. Meow Media Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 696 (6th Cir. 2002) (extending
First Amendment protections to video game when plaintiff sought tort liability against game producers
for communicative aspects of the game); Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572,
579–80 (7th Cir. 2001) (recognizing First Amendment protections of video games against city
ordinance limiting access of minors to violent games).
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music, and literature.18 The Ninth Circuit found that “story-laden video games
. . . are similar to movies, which the [Supreme] Court has long held are
protected expression notwithstanding their ability to entertain as well as
inform.”19 In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the First Amendment’s
protection of video games, holding:
Like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them,
video games communicate ideas—and even social messages—
through many familiar literary devices (such as characters, dialogue,
plot and music) and through features distinctive to the medium (such
as the player’s interaction with the virtual world). That suffices to
confer First Amendment protection.20
Nevertheless, recent decisions and commentary by lower courts
sometimes suggest a view of video games as less deserving of First
Amendment protection than other expressive works.21 These courts often
view video games more as products or merchandise rather than as expressive
works.22 For example, the 2018 California Court of Appeal decision in de
Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC distinguished “expressive works such as
films, plays, and television programs” from “products and merchandise such
as T-shirts and lithographs, greeting cards, and video games, or
18. Interactive Dig. Software Ass’n, 329 F.3d at 957 (comparing these elements of video games to
the “painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis
Carroll”).
19. Video Software Dealers Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 958 n.11.
20. Brown, 564 U.S. at 790.
21. See generally William K. Ford, So Are Games Coffee Mugs or What? Games and the Right of
Publicity Revisited, 19 UIC REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 178 (2020) [hereinafter So Are Games Coffee Mugs
or What?] (discussing how video games are still treated like celebrity memorabilia but predicting a
shift in the way courts will treat them in the near future); William K. Ford, Restoring Rogers: Video
Games, False Association Claims, and the “Explicitly Misleading” Use of Trademarks, 16 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 306, 310–311 (2017) [hereinafter Restoring Rogers] (discussing
the evolution of different approaches to First Amendment rights and video games in the Ninth Circuit
and the specific issue of judges seeing video games not as distinguishable from t-shirts and mugs);
William K. Ford & Raizel Liebler, Games Are Not Coffee Mugs: Games and the Right of Publicity,
29 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L. J. 1 (2012) (arguing that the evolution of games calls for a new
approach in rights of publicity claims that treats games as more than memorabilia).
22. See So Are Games Coffee Mugs or What?, supra note 21, at 179 (noting that lower court
decisions after Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n have “failed to drag games out of the merchandise
category for purposes of the right of publicity”); Ford & Liebler, supra note 21, at 89 (“Games are
treated differently than newspapers, magazines, books, and films because these courts perceive games
as an inferior medium of expression, i.e., as merchandise like coffee mugs and T-shirts.”).
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advertisements for products and merchandise.”23 Similarly, during a 2014
oral argument in Davis v. Electronic Arts Inc,24 when EA’s counsel sought to
distinguish video games and other expressive works from greeting cards and
t-shirts, a judge commented that “99% of greeting cards, it seems to me, have
pictures and they have writing and they’re at least as expressive as a video
game, probably more so.”25 The court’s opinion ultimately distinguished the
case before it involving a video game from “cases involving other kinds of
expressive works.”26 Similar examples appear later in this article.27
III. CASES BALANCING THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S PROTECTION OF VIDEO
GAMES WITH TRADEMARK RIGHTS
A. Federal Trademark Rights: The Lanham Act
The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq., establishes federal trademark
law.28 Broadly speaking, “[a] trademark is a word, phrase or symbol that is
used to identify a manufacturer or sponsor of a good or the provider of a
service.”29 Among other things, the Lanham Act prohibits trademark
infringement, false designations of origin, and false endorsement.30 Section
1114(1)(a) prohibits the use of a registered trademark “in connection with the
sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on
23. 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625, 636, 641 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (emphasis added) (internal citations
omitted), review denied (July 11, 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 800, 202 L. Ed. 2d 572 (2019).
24. 775 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2015).
25. Oral Argument at 9:33, Davis v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 775 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 1215737), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_hlz3cx6IWQ; see also Restoring Rogers, supra note 21,
at 311 (emphasis omitted) (explaining why the comparison of video games to greeting cards is
striking).
26. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1279, n.10
(9th Cir. 2013).
27. See infra Section V.B.
28. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5:4
(5th ed. 2020) [hereinafter TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION]; see also 3 TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION at § 22:1–22:1.50 (“Federal trademark law does not preempt state trademark
law,” and most states have adopted trademark law similar to federal trademark law.). This article
focuses on federal law. See infra Sections III.C–D, IV.D, V.C.
29. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002); see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 1127 (2012) (defining trademark, service mark, and other related terms); TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION, supra note 28, § 3:1 (defining a trademark as “a designation used to identify and
distinguish the source of goods and services of a person or company”).
30. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2016).
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or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive.”31 Section 1125(a)(1) prohibits the use of:
Any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact,
which––(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person
with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of
his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person,
or (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or
another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities.32
Trademark rights serve dual purposes: they “protect consumers from
deception and confusion over trademarks” and they “protect the plaintiff’s
infringed trademark as property.”33 In Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,
Justice Stevens reviewed the Senate Report for the Lanham Act and found
two stated goals:
The purpose underlying any trade-mark statute is twofold. One is to
protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product
bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get
the product which it asks for and wants to get. Secondly, where the
owner of a trade-mark has spent energy, time, and money in
presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his investment
from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats. This is the wellestablished rule of law protecting both the public and the trade-mark
owner.34

31. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)–(a)(1)(B) (2016).
33. See TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 28, § 2:2. As McCarthy explains,
however, commentators have disagreed over whether the historical purpose of trademark law is to
protect the consumer from confusion or to protect the mark owner’s property right. See TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 28, § 2:1.
34. 505 U.S. 763, 782, n.15 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting S. REP. NO. 1333, at 3 (1946)); see
also Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (describing the “basic objectives of
trademark law”). Many articles have discussed the purposes of trademark law. See, e.g., Ned Snow,
Free Speech & Disparaging Trademarks, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1639, 1666–77 (2016); Noa Tai, Aesthetic

433

[Vol. 48: 425, 2021]

Protecting the First Amendment Rights of Video Games
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

The Ninth Circuit has described the “core purpose” of trademark law as
“avoiding confusion in the marketplace” by “preventing others from duping
consumers into buying a product they mistakenly believe is sponsored by the
trademark owner.”35 Avoiding consumer confusion serves the two goals of
“assur[ing] a potential customer” that the item with the mark “is made by the
same producer as other similarly marked items” and assuring the producer that
“it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related
rewards associated with a desirable product.”36
B. The Second Circuit’s Rogers v. Grimaldi test
In 1989, the Second Circuit issued its seminal decision in Rogers v.
Grimaldi, which established the test courts would apply to balance the
Lanham Act with the First Amendment for decades to come.37 Actress Ginger
Rogers sued an Italian filmmaker over the film Ginger and Fred, which told
“the story of two fictional cabaret performers” who imitated Rogers and Fred
Astaire and “became known in Italy as Ginger and Fred.”38 Rogers alleged
the filmmaker violated the Lanham Act, her right of publicity, and her right
to privacy.39 She argued the filmmaker violated the Lanham Act by “creating
the false impression that the film was about her or that she sponsored,
endorsed, or was otherwise involved in the film.”40
The Second Circuit recognized the conflict between the Lanham Act’s
protection of consumers and the First Amendment’s protection of artistic
expressions: “Movies, plays, books, and songs are all indisputably works of
artistic expression and deserve protection,” but those works are “also sold in
the commercial marketplace like other more utilitarian products, making the
danger of consumer deception a legitimate concern that warrants some
Functionality: Trademark Law’s Red Herring Doctrine, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 25, 28–30 (2013).
35. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Au-Tomotive
Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The principal role of
trademark law is to ensure that consumers are able to identify the source of goods.”).
36. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164; Au-Tomotive Gold, 457 F.3d at 1067 (noting that “[p]rotecting the
source-identifying role of trademarks serves [these] two goals”).
37. See 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).
38. Id. at 996–97. As the Second Circuit explained, “Rogers and the late Fred Astaire are among
the most famous duos in show business history” who “established themselves as paragons of style,
elegance, and grace.” Id. at 996.
39. Id. at 997.
40. Id.
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government regulation.”41
The court concluded that, “[b]ecause
overextension of Lanham Act restrictions in the area of titles might intrude on
First Amendment values, we must construe the Act narrowly to avoid such a
conflict.”42
The court then analyzed what test should apply.43 It rejected the
“alternative means” test, where “First Amendment concerns are implicated
only where a title is so intimately related to the subject matter of a work that
the author has no alternative means of expressing what the work is about.”44
Instead, the court found “the [Lanham Act] should be construed to apply to
artistic works only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion
outweighs the public interest in free expression.”45 “That balance,” the court
said, “will normally not support application of the [Lanham] Act unless the
title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has
some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the source or
the content of the work.”46
The Second Circuit explained the rationale behind this two-part test, that
“[a] misleading title with no artistic relevance cannot be sufficiently justified
by a free expression interest.”47 Moreover, a title with “minimal artistic
relevance but [that] was explicitly misleading as to source or content” could
still violate the Lanham Act.48 But when “the title is artistically relevant to
the work . . . the slight risk that such use of a celebrity’s name might implicitly
suggest endorsement or sponsorship to some people is outweighed by the
danger of restricting artistic expression, and the Lanham Act is not
applicable.”49
Applying this test, the court found “[t]he title ‘Ginger and Fred’
surpasse[d] the minimum threshold of artistic relevance to the film’s content”
because “the central characters in the film are nicknamed ‘Ginger and Fred,’
and these names are not arbitrarily chosen just to exploit the publicity value

41. Id.
42. Id. at 998.
43. Id. at 998–1000.
44. Id. at 998. The Second Circuit had previously applied the “no alternative means” test in Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979).
45. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 1000.
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of their real life counterparts but instead have genuine relevance to the film’s
story.”50 It then found the title was not misleading because it “contains no
explicit indication that Rogers endorsed the film or had a role in producing
it,” it “is entirely truthful as to its content in referring to the film’s fictional
protagonists who are known to their Italian audience as ‘Ginger and Fred,’”
and it “has an ironic meaning that is relevant to the film’s content.”51 In short,
any risk that some members of the public might be misled “is outweighed by
the danger that suppressing an artistically relevant though ambiguous title will
unduly restrict expression.”52 Thus, the First Amendment protected the film’s
title.53
C. Development of the Rogers Test in the Ninth Circuit and Its Application
to Video Games
Many courts would later adopt the Rogers test and extend it to the content
of expressive works.54 The Ninth Circuit, however, has led the charge and
developed the most robust jurisdiction on the application of the Rogers test to
video games.55 This is perhaps unsurprising given the number of major video
game publishers in California, including Riot Games,56 Activision Blizzard,57
and Electronic Arts.58
1. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records and Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain
Productions
The Ninth Circuit first adopted the Rogers test in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA
Records, Inc., in which Mattel, the maker of the Barbie dolls, sued MCA

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 1001.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1005.
See Daniel Jacob Wright, Explicitly Explicit: The Rogers Test and the Ninth Circuit, 21 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 193, 203–06 (2013).
55. Id. at 209, 212–13.
56. We Are Rioters, RIOT GAMES, https://www.riotgames.com/en/who-we-are/values (last visited
Oct. 2, 2020) (“Riot is headquartered in Los Angeles, California.”).
57. About Us, ACTIVISION BLIZZARD, https://www.activisionblizzard.com/location (last visited
Oct. 2, 2020) (identifying corporate headquarters in Santa Monica, California).
58. About EA, EA, https://www.ea.com/about (last visited Oct. 2, 2020) (identifying global
headquarters in Redwood City, California).
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Records (and others) for trademark infringement over the song Barbie Girl by
Aqua.59 As Judge Kozinski described, Barbie dolls represent “a symbol of
American girlhood, a public figure who graces the aisles of toy stores
throughout the country and beyond,”60 while “Aqua [was] a Danish band that
has, as yet, only dreamed of attaining Barbie-like status.”61 “In the song, one
bandmember impersonates Barbie, singing in a high-pitched, doll-like voice;
another bandmember, calling himself Ken, entices Barbie ‘to go party.’”62
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit’s analysis in Rogers and
adopted the Rogers test as its own.63 Applying the test, the court first found
“the use of Barbie in the song title clearly is relevant to the underlying work,”
since “the song is about Barbie and the values Aqua claims she represents.”64
The court then found “[t]he song title [did] not explicitly mislead as to the
source of the work [because] it does not, explicitly or otherwise, suggest that
it was produced by Mattel.”65 The court noted that “[the] only indication that
Mattel might be associated with the song is the use of Barbie in the title,” and
that alone could not be enough or the Rogers test would be rendered a nullity.66
A year after MCA Records, the Ninth Circuit reiterated its adoption of the
Rogers test in Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions.67 Mattel had
sued photographer Thomas Forsythe over “a series of [seventy-eight]
photographs entitled ‘Food Chain Barbie,’ . . . [which] depicted Barbie in
various absurd and often sexualized positions.”68 “Forsythe describe[d] the
message behind his photographic series as an attempt to ‘critique[] the
objectification of women associated with [Barbie], and [] [to] lambast[] the
conventional beauty myth and the societal acceptance of women as objects
because this is what Barbie embodies.’”69
The Ninth Circuit found Forsythe’s work was a parody entitled to First

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 898.
Id. at 899.
Id. at 899.
Id. at 902.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 807 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 796.
Id. (alterations in original).
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Amendment protection,70 and then went on to apply the Rogers test.71 As for
artistic relevance, the court found “Forsythe’s use of the Barbie mark is clearly
relevant to his work.”72 As for whether the use was explicitly misleading, the
court found “[t]he Barbie mark in the titles of Forsythe’s works and on his
website accurately describe[s] the subject of the photographs, which in turn,
depict Barbie and target the doll with Forsythe’s parodic message.”73
2. E.S.S. Entertainment 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc.
Like Rogers, MCA Records and Walking Mountain involved titles of
expressive works—the Barbie Girl song and the Food Chain Barbie
photograph series.74 And Walking Mountain expressly left open the question
whether the Ninth Circuit would apply the Rogers test to the body of an
expressive work.75
Five years after Walking Mountain, the Ninth Circuit applied the Rogers
test both to the body of an expressive work and to the use of a trademark in a
video game in E.S.S. Entertainment 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc.76
There, the operator of the strip club Play Pen Gentlemen’s Club in East Los
Angeles sued Rockstar Games, a subsidiary of Take-Two Interactive, over the
depiction of a strip club in Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas.77
The Grand Theft Auto “[s]eries is known for an irreverent and sometimes
crass brand of humor, gratuitous violence and sex, and overall seediness.”78
“Each game . . . takes place in one or more dystopic, cartoonish cities modeled
after actual American urban areas.”79 San Andreas takes place in cities “based
on Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Las Vegas.”80 Los Santos—the city based

70. Id. at 801–03.
71. Id. at 807. In doing so, the court placed heavy emphasis on Barbie’s “cultural significance,”
just as it had done in MCA. Id. (“Where a mark assumes such cultural significance, First Amendment
protections come into play. . . . As we determined in MCA, Mattel’s ‘Barbie’ mark has taken on such
a role in our culture.”).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See supra Part C.1.
75. See Walking Mountain, 353 F.3d at 808–09, nn.14 & 17.
76. 547 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2008).
77. Id. at 1096–98.
78. Id. at 1096.
79. Id. at 1097.
80. Id.

438

[Vol. 48: 425, 2021]

Protecting the First Amendment Rights of Video Games
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

on Los Angeles—“mimics the look and feel of actual Los Angeles
neighborhoods” by populating the city “with [] liquor stores, ammunition
dealers, casinos, pawn shops, tattoo parlors, bars, and strip clubs.”81 In East
Los Santos, “the [g]ame’s version of East Los Angeles,” Rockstar included
“variations on the businesses and architecture of the real thing, including a
virtual, cartoon-style strip club known as the ‘Pig Pen.’”82 ESS argued that
Rockstar’s depiction of the Pig Pen used the Play Pen’s “distinctive logo and
trade dress” and “created a likelihood of confusion among consumers as to
whether ESS has endorsed, or is associated with, the video depiction” of the
club.83
The Ninth Circuit first found that, while the Rogers test “traditionally
applies to uses of a trademark in the title of an artistic work, there is no
principled reason why it ought not also apply to the use of a trademark in the
body of the work.”84 The court then applied the test.85 It clarified that “the
level of [artistic] relevance merely must be above zero” to merit First
Amendment protection.86 The court found it irrelevant whether the Play Pen
itself had any cultural significance.87 The distinctiveness of East Los Angeles
“[lay] in its ‘look and feel,’” which was “relevant to Rockstar’s artistic goal
. . . to develop a cartoon-style parody of East Los Angeles.”88 The court
concluded that “[p]ossibly the only way, and certainly a reasonable way, to
do that is to recreate a critical mass of the businesses and buildings that
constitute it”––“includ[ing] a strip club similar in look and feel to the Play
Pen.”89
Turning to the explicitly misleading prong, the court noted the analysis
“points directly at the purpose of trademark law, namely to ‘avoid confusion
in the marketplace by allowing a trademark owner to prevent others from
duping customers into buying a product they mistakenly believe is sponsored
by the trademark owner.’”90 The court reiterated that mere use of the

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1098.
See id. at 1099.
Id. at 1099–1100.
Id. at 1100.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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trademark was not enough; instead, the relevant question was “whether the
Game would confuse its players into thinking that the Play Pen [was]
somehow behind the Pig Pen or that it sponsor[ed]” the game.91 It found San
Andreas and the Play Pen had “nothing in common” other than “offer[ing] a
form of lowbrow entertainment.”92 Nothing suggested anyone would
reasonably believe that ESS produced the game or that Rockstar operated a
strip club.93 Moreover, a player would not “think ESS had provided [any]
expertise, support, or unique strip-club knowledge it possesses to the
production of the game.”94 “[T]he Game [did] not revolve around running or
patronizing a strip club,” and “[w]hatever one can do at the Pig Pen seems
quite incidental to the overall story of the Game.”95 Finally, “[a] reasonable
consumer would not think a company that owns one strip club in East Los
Angeles, which is not well known to the public at large, also produces a
technology sophisticated video game like San Andreas.”96
3. Confusion Within the District Courts
After ESS, some confusion developed in the district courts over three
issues: (1) whether the Rogers test applies only to trademarks that have
achieved cultural significance, (2) whether a defendant must use the mark to
refer to the plaintiff for it to have artistic relevance, and (3) the role of the
likelihood of confusion test in the Rogers analysis.97 Two decisions from the
Northern District of California illustrate the difficulties lower courts had in
applying the Rogers test.
In Rebelution, LLC v. Perez, a reggae band using the name “Rebelution”
in its business and in a self-titled album sued Armando Perez (known as
Pitbull) because he used the word rebelution in the title of a record.98 The
district court denied Pitbull’s summary judgment motion based on the Rogers
test on two relevant grounds.99
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1100–01 (italics added).
97. See Wright, supra note 54, at 209–13.
98. 732 F. Supp. 2d 883, 885–886 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
99. Id. at 889. Relying on footnote 5 in Rogers, the court also held the Rogers test did not apply
because the case before it involved two confusingly similar titles. Id. at 888. While a full discussion

440

[Vol. 48: 425, 2021]

Protecting the First Amendment Rights of Video Games
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

First, citing MCA Records and Walking Mountain, the district court found
the Ninth Circuit had “placed an important threshold limitation upon its
application: plaintiff’s mark must be of such cultural significance that it has
become an integral part of the public’s vocabulary.”100 The Ninth Circuit’s
decisions in MCA Records and Walking Mountain heavily emphasized
Barbie’s cultural significance, and Judge Kozinski suggested the conflict
between the Lanham Act and the First Amendment “arises when trademarks
transcend their identifying purpose” and “enter our public discourse and
become an integral part of our vocabulary.”101 In Rebelution, because neither
the word “rebelution” nor plaintiff’s mark had cultural significance, the court
found “no First Amendment rights are implicated and the Rogers test is
inapplicable.”102
Second, the court surveyed “every federal court of appeals case
addressing the artistic adoption of plaintiff’s non-generic mark” and found
that a defendant’s use of a mark must “be with reference to the meaning
associated with plaintiff’s mark” to have artistic relevance under the first part
of the Rogers test.103 In other words, the court found Pitbull had to show “he
intended to refer to plaintiff when he used plaintiff’s mark,” and he did not do
so.104
of the distinction between titles and contents of expressive works is beyond the scope of this article,
this holding does not withstand scrutiny. See Lynn M. Jordan & David M. Kelly, Another Decade of
Rogers v. Grimaldi: Continuing to Balance the Lanham Act with the First Amendment Rights of
Creators of Artistic Works, 109 TRADEMARK REP. 833, 846–47 (2019). The Second Circuit clarified
that the Rogers test applies to cases involving titles alleged to be confusingly similar but that the
explicitly misleading prong would include a likelihood of confusion analysis. See Cliffs Notes, Inc.
v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989); Twin Peaks Prods.,
Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d Cir. 1993). One district court within the Ninth
Circuit also found the Rogers test applies to cases involving similar titles and that any similarities
simply bear on the explicitly misleading prong of the test. See CI Games S.A. v. Destination Films,
No. 2:16-cv-05719-SVW-JC, 2016 WL 9185391, at *3–5, *8–9 (C. D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2016).
100. See Rebelution, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 887.
101. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2000). Judge Kozinski further
said that
when a trademark owner asserts a right to control how we express ourselves—when we’d
find it difficult to describe the product any other way (as in the case of aspirin), or when
the mark (like Rolls Royce) has taken on an expressive meaning apart from its sourceidentifying function—applying the traditional [likelihood of confusion] test fails to account
for the full weight of the public’s interest in free expression.”
Id.
102. Rebelution, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 888.
103. Id. at 888–89.
104. Id. at 889.
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In Electronic Arts, Inc. v. Textron Inc., Electronic Arts (“EA”) sued
Textron, the holding company of Bell’s intellectual property rights, for
declaratory judgment and non-infringement over the depiction of certain Bell
helicopters in EA’s Battlefield 3.105 Textron filed counterclaims alleging
trademark infringement and other claims.106
The district court addressed EA’s motion to dismiss Textron’s
counterclaims.107 Without addressing the applicability of the Rogers test or
the artistic relevance prong, the court focused its analysis on whether EA’s
use of the helicopters was explicitly misleading as to the source and content
of Battlefield 3.108 In doing so, the court appeared to apply a likelihood of
confusion analysis.109 At the same time, however, the court found that
Textron’s counter-complaint alleged “that the helicopters were a main selling
point for the game” and “EA intended consumer confusion.”110
Rebelution and Textron raised several questions. First, does the Rogers
test apply only to trademarks that have achieved cultural significance?
Second, must the defendant’s use of the mark refer to the plaintiff? Third,
does the likelihood of confusion analysis have any place in the Rogers test?
The Ninth Circuit would later answer all three questions with a resounding
“no.”
4. Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc.
In 2013, the Ninth Circuit applied the Rogers test to a video game in
Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc., where legendary former NFL player and NFL
Hall of Fame member Jim Brown sued EA over the use of his likeness in the
Madden NFL series based on a false endorsement theory.111 This case
presented the Ninth Circuit with the first opportunity to clarify the Rogers test
after Rebelution and Textron, and after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n.
105. No. C 12-00118 WHA, 2012 WL 3042668, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2012).
106. Id. at *1.
107. Id. at *2.
108. Id. at *3.
109. See id. at *4 (appearing to reject EA’s contention “that the ‘likelihood of confusion’ analysis
should not come into play unless the work fails the Rogers test”).
110. Id. at *5. These findings suggest the court’s somewhat muddied analysis and reference to the
likelihood of confusion test might nevertheless have focused on the right question: whether EA’s use
of Textron’s trademarks was explicitly misleading as to the source or content of the work. See id.
111. See Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1239–41 (9th Cir. 2013).
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In Madden NFL, players “control avatars representing professional
football players as those avatars participate in simulated NFL games” and
“participate in other aspects of a simulated NFL by, for example, creating and
managing a franchise.”112 Each version of Madden NFL includes the NFL
teams and their rosters for that year, and each avatar is designed to mirror a
real player, “including the player’s name, jersey number, physical attributes,
and physical skills.”113 Some versions of Madden NFL “also include historical
and all-time teams,” where player names are not used but are nevertheless
“recognizable due to the accuracy of their team affiliations, playing positions,
ages, heights, weights, ability levels, and other attributes.”114 While EA
licenses from the NFL and NFL Players Association for its use of the names
and likenesses of current players, those licenses do not cover former players
such as Brown, who played for the Cleveland Browns from 1957 to 1965.115
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by holding that the Rogers test alone
applies to cases balancing the Lanham Act against First Amendment rights in
expressive works.116 The court rejected the likelihood of confusion test and
the alternative means test, finding that both tests “fail[ed] to account for the
full weight of the public’s interest in free expression.”117 As the court
explained, “[t]he only relevant legal framework for balancing the public’s
right to be free from consumer confusion about Brown’s affiliation with
Madden NFL and EA’s First Amendment rights in the context of Brown’s
[Lanham Act] claim is the Rogers test.”118
In reaching this result, the court discussed the Supreme Court’s recent
holding in Brown and quipped, “[e]ven if Madden NFL is not the expressive
equal of Anna Karenina or Citizen Kane, the Supreme Court has answered
with an emphatic ‘yes’ when faced with the question of whether video games
deserve the same protection as more traditional forms of expression.”119 The
court suggested there might be a “line to be drawn between expressive video
games and non-expressive video games,” but every version of Madden NFL
is expressive because they “feature[] characters (players), dialogue (between
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 1240.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1239–40.
See id. at 1241.
Id. at 1241–42 (quoting Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002)).
Id. at 1242.
Id. at 1241.

443

[Vol. 48: 425, 2021]

Protecting the First Amendment Rights of Video Games
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

announcers), plot (both within a particular simulated game and more broadly),
and music,” as well as “[i]nteraction between the virtual world of the game
and individuals playing the game.”120
Applying the Rogers test, the Ninth Circuit found the use of Brown’s
likeness had artistic relevance.121 The court focused on the game’s realism:
“EA prides itself on the extreme realism of the games,” and the “importance
of including Brown’s likeness to realistically recreate one of the teams in the
game” made it obvious that his “likeness has at least some artistic relevance
to EA’s work.”122 Moreover, the court found the “content of the Madden NFL
games––the simulation of NFL football––is clearly related” to Brown, a
former NFL player.123
Next, the Ninth Circuit clarified that the key to satisfying the explicitly
misleading analysis is “that the creator must explicitly mislead consumers.”124
Thus, the test focuses on “whether the [use of Brown’s likeness] would
confuse [Madden NFL] players into thinking that [Brown] is somehow behind
[the games] or that [he] sponsors [EA’s] product,” as well as “whether there
was an ‘explicit indication,’ ‘overt claim,’ or ‘explicit misstatement’ that
caused such consumer confusion.”125 The use of Brown’s likeness alone did
not satisfy this test, nor did evidence showing that consumers believed that
Brown endorsed Madden NFL.126 Instead, the court held that any “evidence
must relate to the nature of the behavior of the identifying material’s user, not
the impact of the use.”127
The court’s findings regarding two specific materials Brown pointed to
are of interest. First, the court found EA’s statement that Madden NFL
included “[f]ifty of the NFL’s greatest players and every All-Madden team”
showed no attempt to mislead consumers because the statement was true.128
Second, the court addressed a statement by EA officials saying “EA was able
to use the images and likenesses of players because it obtained written
120. Id.
121. See id. at 1243.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1243–44.
124. Id. at 1245.
125. Id. (quoting E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir.
2008) and Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1001 (2d Cir. 1989)) (alterations in original).
126. See id. at 1245–46 (noting that Brown put forth several arguments to show that he satisfied the
second prong of the Rogers test; however, his arguments were ultimately unsuccessful).
127. Id. at 1246.
128. Id. (alteration in original).
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authorization from both the NFL players and the NFL.”129 The court found
this was “perhaps the closest Brown [came] to offering evidence that EA acted
in an explicitly misleading manner as to Brown’s endorsement of the game,”
but it had no need to address whether the statement itself could be explicitly
misleading because EA made the statement only to a limited audience.130
Thus, Brown failed to show EA explicitly misled consumers regarding his
involvement.131
Brown clarified Ninth Circuit law on the intersection between the Lanham
Act and the First Amendment in two important ways. First, by expressly
rejecting the likelihood of confusion and alternative means tests, the Ninth
Circuit resolved any ambiguity that Textron might have caused regarding the
role of alternative tests in the Rogers analysis.132 Second, the court clarified
that the explicitly misleading prong of the Rogers test requires an “explicit
indication,” “overt claim,” or “explicit misstatement” causing consumer
confusion.133
5. VIRAG, S.R.L. v. Sony Computer Entertainment America LLC
Four years after Brown, the Ninth Circuit again applied the Rogers test in
VIRAG, S.R.L. v. Sony Computer Entertainment America LLC.134 VIRAG was
an Italian company and leader in the commercial flooring business.135 In
2004, VIRAG began sponsoring the Rally of Monza race, which takes place
on the Autodromo Nazionale Monza racetrack in Monza, Italy.136 VIRAG’s
name and trademark began appearing in 2006 “on a bridge over the track on
which the Rally of Monza occurs.”137 VIRAG also sponsored a car for one of

129. Id. at 1247.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 1248 (noting that the district court had discretion in deciding this issue in response
to a motion to dismiss).
132. See id. at 1241–43.
133. Id. at 1245 (quoting Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1001 (2d Cir. 1989)).
134. See 699 F. App’x 667, 668 (9th Cir. 2017). Because the Ninth Circuit issued a short
memorandum opinion, this article takes the facts and analysis mainly from the Northern District of
California’s order granting Sony’s motion to dismiss. See VIRAG, S.R.L. v. Sony Comput. Entm’t
Am. LLC, No. 3:15-cv-01729-LB, 2015 WL 5000102 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015), aff’d, 699 F. App’x
667 (9th Cir. 2017).
135. VIRAG, 2015 WL 5000102, at *1.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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its owners, Mirco Virag, who competed in the Rally of Monza.138
Meanwhile, Sony published the Gran Turismo series of racing games,
which allowed players to drive simulations of real race cars on simulations of
real race tracks.139 Sony introduced the Monza track in Gran Turismo 5,
where it also displayed VIRAG’s trademark on a simulation of the bridge of
the Monza track.140 Gran Turismo 6 also included the Monza track and the
VIRAG mark.141
VIRAG sued Sony, alleging claims under the Lanham Act.142 The district
court granted Sony’s motion to dismiss these claims.143 The court rejected
VIRAG’s argument that the games were not expressive works subject to First
Amendment protection, finding that they have “characters (the race car
drivers), plot (the drama of the races), and music.”144 The games also have
“meaningful interaction between the game player and the virtual world: how
else would a game player play the games? By not interacting with them?”145
Thus, just as Madden NFL was an expressive work, so too were the Gran
Turismo games.146
The district court also rejected VIRAG’s argument that the Rogers test
did not apply because the VIRAG mark did not have cultural significance.147
In a lengthy analysis, the court surveyed Ninth Circuit precedent from MCA
Records to Brown and district court opinions from Rebelution to Mil-Spec
Monkey and concluded that the Rogers test is not limited to culturally
significant marks.148
After disposing of these preliminary issues, the court applied the Rogers
test. Focusing on the goal of realism in Gran Turismo 5 and Gran Turismo 6,
the court found Sony’s use of the VIRAG mark had artistic relevance because

138. Id.
139. See id. at *2.
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at *1. VIRAG and Mirco Virag also sued Sony for violating their rights of publicity. Id.
143. See id. (dismissing VIRAG’s three claims with prejudice but denying Sony’s motion to dismiss
Mirco Virag’s request for punitive damages).
144. Id. at *8.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See id. at *9 (noting that the plaintiffs contended that the Rogers test did not apply because the
VIRAG mark did not have “such cultural significance” that it has “become an integral part of our
vocabulary”).
148. See id. at *9–10.
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“the games seek to provide a realistic simulation of European car racing,
including by allowing players to drive on realistic simulations of European
race tracks (like the Monza Track).”149 The court then found “no plausible
support” for VIRAG’s argument that Sony used the VIRAG mark to
“explicitly mislead consumers as to the source or content of Gran Turismo 5
or Gran Turismo 6.”150 VIRAG’s allegation that consumers might think
VIRAG “provided expertise and knowledge for the games or sponsored them”
because of its “involvement in the European racing scene” was not enough,
since “[t]he focus of the second prong of the Rogers test is on whether the
defendants explicitly mislead consumers as to the source or content of the
work” and VIRAG had only alleged that Sony used the VIRAG mark.151 The
court reiterated the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Brown “that a defendant must
give an ‘explicit indication’ or make an ‘overt claim’ or ‘explicit
misstatement’ that causes consumer confusion.”152
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit dispatched VIRAG’s arguments in a short,
four paragraph memorandum opinion that included two important
clarifications of the law: “The test set forth in [Rogers] applies regardless
whether the VIRAG trademark has independent cultural significance, or
Sony’s use of the trademark within the video game serves to communicate a
message other than the source of the trademark.”153 In this single sentence,
the Ninth Circuit dispelled any lingering doubts that Rebelution might have
raised on these issues.154
The Ninth Circuit continues to develop the Rogers test to this day, but its
application to video games now appears well-settled. 155
149. Id. at *11.
150. Id. at *12 (italics added).
151. Id.
152. Id. at *13 (quoting Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1245 (9th Cir. 2013)).
153. VIRAG, S.R.L. v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 699 F. App’x 667, 668 (9th Cir. 2017)
(citations omitted).
154. See Look Before You Leap: Trademark Decision Highlights Importance of Thorough PreLitigation Assessment of Case, SPRINGUT LAW (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.springutlaw.com/blog/
2017/12/14/trademark-decision-highlights-importance-of-thorough-pre-litigation-assessment-of-case
(“The Ninth Circuit’s affirmance rejected a controversial line of district-court cases that would have
limited [the Rogers test] to cultural icons.”). Curiously, despite clarifying these important aspects of
the Rogers test, the Ninth Circuit disposed of VIRAG’s appeal in an unpublished, non-precedential
opinion. See VIRAG, 699 F. App’x at 668, n.*.
155. See discussion supra Section III.C. Other cases outside the video game context have further
developed the Rogers test in the Ninth Circuit. See discussion supra Section III.C.3. In a case
involving a television series, the Ninth Circuit expanded the Rogers test to apply not only to content
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D. Other Jurisdictions Applying the Rogers Test to Video Games
Few courts outside the Ninth Circuit have addressed the Rogers test in the
video game context. For example, despite creating the Rogers test more than
three decades ago, the Second Circuit so far has had no opportunity to apply
it in the context of video games. Nevertheless, the few decisions that do exist
provide important data.
1. AM General LLC v. Activision Blizzard, Inc.
Since 2003, Activision has published the Call of Duty military action
video game series, which has become one of the “most popular and wellknown video game franchises in the world.”156 In the Call of Duty games, the
“player assumes control of a military soldier and fights against a computercontrolled or human-controlled opponent across a variety of computer[]generated battlefields.”157 Each game depicts military combat in a realistic
wartime setting, providing players with “very realistic and convincing . . .
portrayal[s] of modern combat operations.”158 To provide this realism, the
games use real-world locations and military organizations, uniforms,
weapons, equipment, and vehicles actually used in the real world.159
One of the vehicles included in the Call of Duty games is the Humvee.160
The Humvee—the colloquial term for the High Mobility Multipurpose
Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)—has been “the backbone of U.S. defense
tactical vehicle fleets around the world” and “an essential part of U.S. military
within an expressive work, but also to promotional activities such as “appearances by cast members
in other media, radio play, online advertising, live events, and the sale or licensing of consumer
goods.” See Twentieth Century Fox Television v. Empire Distrib., Inc., 875 F.3d 1192, 1196 (9th Cir.
2017). Twentieth Century Fox will likely be relevant to video game cases in which a plaintiff alleges
the unauthorized use of a mark or likeness in advertising. See id. Further, in a case involving the use
of trademarks on greeting cards, the Ninth Circuit raised additional considerations such as whether
consumers would view a mark alone as identifying the source of the expressive work, the degree to
which the user and the mark owner use the marks in the same way, and the extent to which the user
adds its own expressive content to the work beyond the mark itself. See Gordon v. Drape Creative,
Inc., 909 F.3d 257, 270 (9th Cir. 2018). These considerations might make sense in the context of
products such as greeting cards, but they likely will rarely apply to video games. See id.
156. AM Gen. LLC v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 3d 467, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
157. Novalogic, Inc. v. Activision Blizzard, 41 F. Supp. 3d 885, 890 (C.D. Cal. 2013).
158. Id.; see also AM General, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 475 (stating the “first-person shooter series . . . is
characterized by its realism, cinematic set-pieces, and fast-paced multiplayer mode”).
159. See Novalogic, 41 F. Supp. 3d at 890.
160. See AM General, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 475.
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operations” for decades.161 “From Panama to Somalia, and to this day in Iraq
and Afghanistan, the Humvee has become an iconic and a ubiquitous symbol
of the modern American military.”162 Nine Call of Duty games depict
Humvees.163
AM General, the producer of the Humvee and the owner of the Humvee
and related trademarks, sued Activision.164 This case represented at least the
third in a series against Activision for using trademarks in the Call of Duty
series.165 In March 2020, the Southern District of New York applied the
Rogers test and granted Activision’s motion for summary judgment.166
The court recognized the artistic relevance requirement is “real, [but] not
unduly rigorous out of the understanding that the ‘overextension of Lanham
Act restrictions might intrude on First Amendment values.’”167 Activision’s
use of the Humvee marks had artistic relevance because “[f]eaturing actual
vehicles used by military operations around the world in video games about
simulated modern warfare surely evokes a sense of realism and lifelikeness to
the player who ‘assumes control of a military soldier and fights against a
computer-controlled or human-controlled opponent across a variety of
computer-generated battlefields.’”168 In short, the court found, “[i]f realism is
an artistic goal, then the presence in modern warfare games of vehicles
employed by actual militaries undoubtedly furthers that goal.”169 Moreover,
“assuming arguendo that realism is the only artistic interest that Call of Duty
games possess—an assumption potentially belied by the presence of narrative
campaign modes in all of the challenged games—it is also true that realism
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 475–76.
165. See, e.g., id. at 476; Mil-Spec Monkey, Inc. v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1134,
1136 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (noting that the plaintiff sued Activision over the use of an “angry monkey”
mark in Call of Duty: Ghosts); Novalogic, Inc. v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 3d 885, 888–
89 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (noting that the plaintiff sued Activision over the use of the “Delta Force” word
and design marks in Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3).
166. See AM General, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 479–80, 489.
167. Id. at 477.
168. Id. at 479 (quoting Novalogic, 41 F. Supp. 3d at 890. The court also adopted the reasoning in
another case that found Activision’s use of a trademark in Call of Duty “easily met the artistic
relevance requirement” because it “gave players a ‘sense of a particularized reality of being part of an
actual elite special forces operation and serve[d] as a means to increase specific realism of the game.’”
Id. (citing Novalogic, 41 F. Supp. 3d at 900).
169. Id. at 484.
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can have artistic merit in itself.”170
To analyze the explicitly leading prong, the court applied the eight-factor
analysis developed by the Second Circuit in Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad
Electronics Corp. to determine whether a likelihood of confusion existed.171
The Polaroid factors are the strength of the plaintiff’s trademark, “the degree
of similarity between the two marks,” the proximity of the products and their
competition with one another, “the likelihood that the senior user will enter
the junior user’s market in the future,” evidence of actual confusion, the
“defendant’s good faith in adopting its own mark,” “the quality of the
defendant’s product,” and the sophistication of consumers in the relevant
market.172
The court found the Polaroid factors weighed in Activision’s favor, with
AM General showing only “the strength of its mark and a less than 20 percent
risk of confusion.”173 In analyzing the good faith Polaroid factor, the court
focused on “the intent to sow confusion between the two companies’
products” and found that neither “the presence of Humvees decorated with
Call of Duty logos at several in-person promotional events” nor a boilerplate
statement regarding intellectual property ownership included on user guides
inside the Call of Duty games that did not mention Humvees “demonstrate[d]
a desire to ‘sow confusion between the two companies’ products.’”174
2. Romantics v. Activision Publishing
In the mid-2000s, Activision began publishing the Guitar Hero series of
video games, one of which included Guitar Hero Encore: Rocks the 80s.175
In Rocks the 80s, players “choose among options such as character, costume,

170. Id. at 484–85.
171. Id. at 480–84 (applying the analysis of Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elec. Corp, 287 F.2d 492 (2d
Cir. 1961). Notably, this likelihood of confusion analysis drawn from Second Circuit precedent
departs from the Ninth Circuit’s approach, which does not analyze likelihood of confusion. See supra
Part III.C.4.
172. Am General, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 480–81(quoting Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495).
173. Id. at 484.
174. Id. at 482–83 (quoting Star Indus., Inc. v. Bacardi & Co., 412 F.3d 373, 388 (2d Cir. 2005)).
175. See Press Release Details: Activision Set to Acquire Video Game Publisher RedOctane and Its
Highly Popular Guitar Hero Franchise, ACTIVISION, INC. (May 9, 2006), https://investor.activision.
com/news-releases/news-release-details/activision-set-acquire-video-game-publisher-redoctane-andits. RedOctane published the original Guitar Hero game in 2005, and Activision acquired RedOctane
in 2006. Id.
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and model of guitar.”176 The game then allows “players to pretend they are
playing guitar in a rock band” by simulating the “guitar play of various songs
by correctly timing the pressing of fret buttons and strum bars on a guitar-like
controller.”177
Rocks the 80s contains “thirty songs from the 1980’s to add to the realistic
experience of playing in a rock band from that era.”178 One of the songs is
“What I Like About You,” originally recorded by The Romantics in 1979 and
published in 1980.179 Activision obtained a valid, nonexclusive “synch
license” from the owner of the copyright, which allowed Activision to “make
a new recording of the underlying composition and to use that recording in
synchronization with visual images in the video game to enable game play.”180
As it appears in the game, the song is clearly identified by its title and the
words, “as made famous by The Romantics.”181
The band and its members sued Activision, alleging false endorsement
under the Lanham Act and a violation of their right of publicity.182 On the
false endorsement claim, the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary
judgment for Activision after analyzing the Rogers test and finding the First
Amendment protected Activision’s use of the song in Rocks the 80s.183
The court discussed the “artistic merits” of Rocks the 80s and found
Activision’s use of the song in the game was related to its purpose of allowing
players to pretend they are in a rock band.184 Further, the court found the use
did not explicitly mislead the public as to its source because the game and its
promotional materials contained no “explicit indication” that The Romantics
endorsed the game or had a role in producing it.185 Consumers do not
encounter the song until after they purchase and play the game (and even then,
they might not ever encounter it), and the game describes the song “as made
famous by The Romantics,” thus informing the player that The Romantics did

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Romantics v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d. 758, 762 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 761.
Id. at 766–71.
Id. at 766, 769.
Id. at 769 (citing Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1001 (2d. Cir. 1989)).

451

[Vol. 48: 425, 2021]

Protecting the First Amendment Rights of Video Games
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

not actually perform the version of the song that appears in the game.186
3. Dillinger v. Electronic Arts
In 1969, Mario Puzo wrote the novel The Godfather, which Francis Ford
Coppola later adapted into the The Godfather film trilogy.187 In the late 2000s,
EA developed and published two video games, The Godfather and The
Godfather II, based on the films.188 The first game “simulates the mafia world
in New York during the mid-1900s,” where “[t]he player acts as a member of
the Corleone family” and guides the character “through a variety of missions
predicated on the plot of the original Godfather film.”189 In the second game,
the player guides the character “along the same plot-line as the movies,” but
also “aims to control criminal networks in New York, Miami, and Cuba during
the 1960s.”190 Both games feature “period-appropriate vehicles and
weapons,” including Thompson submachine guns, known as “Tommy Guns,”
commonly associated with legendary criminal John Dillinger.191 In both
games, a player “may choose and use a Tommy Gun identified as the Level
Three ‘Dillinger Tommy Gun,’” one of fifteen firearms in the game.192 In the
second game, a player can also purchase a “Modern Dillinger” and other
weapons as part of a downloadable bundle.193
Dillinger, LLC, which “claims to own the publicity rights” of John
Dillinger and “the trademark rights in the words ‘John Dillinger,’” sued EA.194
The Southern District of Indiana noted that the Seventh Circuit had not yet
adopted the Rogers test, but since the parties agreed the Rogers test controlled
EA’s First Amendment defense to Dillinger’s Lanham Act claims, the court
“accept[ed] the parties’ position as to Rogers application, and assume[d] that
Rogers control[led] without definitely deciding the question.”195
186. Id.
187. Mario Puzo, THE GODFATHER (1969); THE GODFATHER (Paramount 1972); THE GODFATHER
PART II (Paramount 1974); THE GODFATHER PART III (Paramount 1990); see Dillinger, LLC v. Elec.
Arts Inc., No. 1:09-cv-1236-JMS-DKL, 2011 WL 2457678, at *2 (S.D. Ind. June 16, 2011).
188. Dillinger, 2011 WL 2457678, at *2.
189. Id. at *3.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at *1–2.
195. Id. at *4 n.1.
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Turning to the question of artistic relevance, the court found that Tommy
Guns were relevant to the virtual world depicted in the games, and the
“Dillinger name is closely associated with the Tommy Gun.”196 This
connection was
enough to satisfy the Rogers test: The gentleman-bandit, commonly
known for his public persona as a “flashy gangster who dressed well,
womanized, drove around in fast cars, and sprayed Tommy Guns,”
has above-zero relevance to a game whose premise enables players
to act like members of the mafia and spray Tommy Guns.197
The court then addressed whether EA’s use of the Dillinger name
explicitly misleads as to the source and content of the games.198 The court
likely could have begun and ended its analysis with its finding that “plaintiff
points to no explicit misrepresentation.”199 But the court also found “no
evidence that any consumer bought the Godfather Games because of the
Dillinger name,” which was “‘incidental to the overall story of the game’ and
‘not the main selling point of the Game.’”200 And it found no evidence of any
actual consumer confusion: “The Court cannot simply infer that the Dillinger
name confuses the public, let alone that such confusion outweighs First
Amendment concerns.”201
IV. CASES BALANCING THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S PROTECTION OF VIDEO
GAMES WITH THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The above section discussed cases balancing the First Amendment with
the Lanham Act, with every case finding that the First Amendment protects
video games. By contrast, this section discusses cases balancing the First
Amendment with the right of publicity, with many finding against First
Amendment protection.

196. Id. at *4–6.
197. Id. at *5 (citation omitted).
198. Id. at *6–8.
199. Id. at *8.
200. Id. at *7 (quoting E.S.S. Ent. 200, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, 547 F.3d 1095, 1100–01 (9th Cir.
2009)).
201. Id. at *7–8.
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A. The Right of Publicity
The right of publicity refers to a person’s right “to control the commercial
use of his or her identity” or likeness.202 According to the Ninth Circuit, “[t]he
theory of the right is that a celebrity’s identity can be valuable in the
promotion of products, and the celebrity has an interest that may be protected
from the unauthorized commercial exploitation of that identity.”203
The right of publicity originated from the right to privacy.204 The famous
article “The Right to Privacy” by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in
1890,205 as well as early 20th century cases from New York and Georgia
involving the unauthorized use of photographs in advertisements, set the stage
for developing the right to privacy.206 But applying the privacy label to these
cases became a stumbling block in cases where celebrities sued for the
unauthorized use of their name or likeness.207 For example, in O’Brien v.
Pabst Sales Co., a football player sued the Pabst beer company for using his
photograph on an advertising calendar.208 The majority rejected the football
player’s “invasion of privacy” case, while the dissent focused upon the
commercial value of the player’s identity.209
Twelve years after O’Brien, the Second Circuit became the first court to
recognize a cause of action for violation of the right of publicity in Haelan
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.210 The court found that New
202. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY & ROGER E. SCHECHTER, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND
PRIVACY § 1.3 (2d ed. 2020) [hereinafter THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY] (“Today it is
possible to state with clarity that the right of publicity is simply this: it is the inherent right of every
human being to control the commercial use of his or her identity.”); So Are Games Coffee Mugs or
What?, supra note 21, at 180 (“According to McCarthy and Schechter’s leading treatise on the subject,
‘The right of publicity is simply the inherent right of every human being to control the commercial
use of his or her identity.’”).
203. White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398 (quoting Carson v. Here’s Johnny
Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983)).
204. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 150 (3d Cir. 2013). For a more thorough history
than discussed in this article, see THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 202, §§ 1:27–
1.36 (tracing development of right of publicity to the 21st century).
205. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
206. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902); see also Pavesich v. New
England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
207. See THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 202, § 1:25.
208. 124 F.2d 167, 168 (5th Cir. 1941).
209. Id. at 168–71.
210. 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
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York’s common law protected a baseball player’s right in the publicity value
of his photograph, and it coined “right of publicity” as the name of this right.211
Law review articles by Melville Nimmer and William Prosser would further
define and set the groundwork for the right to privacy and the right of
publicity.212
No federal right of publicity exists as of today; instead, thirty-three states
recognize the right by statute, common law, or both, with varying
formulations.213 As one example, California provides both a common law and
a statutory right of publicity. A plaintiff alleging a right of publicity claim
under California common law must establish “(1) the defendant’s use of the
plaintiff’s identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff’s name or likeness to
defendant’s advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and
(4) resulting injury.”214 Similarly, California’s right of publicity statute
provides:
Any person who knowingly uses another’s name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products,
merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or
soliciting purchase of, products, merchandise, goods or services,
without such person’s prior consent . . . shall be liable for any
damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result
thereof.215
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the right of publicity for the only time
more than forty years ago in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.216
There, a performer in a “human cannonball” act sued a television broadcasting
company for broadcasting his entire 15-second performance without his
permission.217 The Court found “the [s]tate’s interest in permitting a ‘right of
211. Id.
212. See generally Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203
(1954); William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
213. See THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 202, §§ 6.2, 6.6. Attempts to enact
a federal right of publicity statute have failed. See Barbara A. Solomon, Can the Lanham Act Protect
Tiger Woods? An Analysis of Whether the Lanham Act is a Proper Substitute for a Federal Right of
Publicity, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 1202, 1210–11 (2004).
214. Local TV, LLC v. Superior Court, 206 Cal. Rptr. 3d 884, 889–90 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting
Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 346 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)).
215. Cal. Civ. Code § 3344 (West 2020).
216. 433 U.S. 562, 563 (1977).
217. Id. at 563–64.
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publicity’ is in protecting the proprietary interest of the individual in his act
in part to encourage such entertainment,”218 and held the First Amendment did
not protect the broadcast of Zacchini’s entire performance because doing so
“poses a substantial threat to the economic value of that performance.”219 In
so holding, however, the Court contrasted “the broadcast of petitioner’s entire
performance” with “the unauthorized use of another’s name for purposes of
trade or the incidental use of a name or picture by the press,” finding the
former “goes to the heart of petitioner’s ability to earn a living as an
entertainer.”220 The court found the “strongest case for a ‘right of publicity’”
involves “not the appropriation of an entertainer’s reputation to enhance the
attractiveness of a commercial product, but the appropriation of the very
activity by which the entertainer acquired his reputation in the first place.”221
Thus, Zacchini offered little guidance in cases involving depictions of
individuals.
B. Development of the Transformative Use Test in Right of Publicity Cases
Following Zacchini, lower courts developed different tests to balance the
First Amendment with the right of publicity.222 Some apply a form of the
Rogers test to determine whether the use of a name or likeness is “wholly
unrelated” to an expressive work or “simply a disguised commercial
advertisement for the sale of goods or services.”223 Others apply the
transformative use test, which has become the dominant test used in right of
publicity cases.224 California was the first to adopt the transformative use test,
so this article begins there.

218. Id. at 573.
219. Id. at 575.
220. Id. at 576.
221. Id.
222. See Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 743 F.3d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The Supreme Court
has not addressed the question, and decisions from the lower courts are a conflicting mix of balancing
tests and frameworks borrowed from other areas of free-speech doctrine.”).
223. Rogers v.Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989) (first quoting Guglielmi v. SpellingGoldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 457 n.6 (Cal. 1979); then quoting Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc.,
427 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)).
224. See infra Sections IV.B.2–3, IV.C, IV.D.1–5.
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1. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions
In 1979, the California Supreme Court decided its seminal right of
publicity case in Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions.225 There, the
successor in interest of actor Rudolph Valentino sued the creators of a
biographical film that told a fictionalized version of Valentino’s life story.226
Chief Justice Bird’s concurrence stated that the First Amendment provided a
complete defense against the plaintiff’s right of publicity claim.227 Chief
Justice Bird observed that “[c]ontemporary events, symbols and people are
regularly used in fictional works,” and “[f]iction writers may be able to more
persuasively, more accurately express themselves by weaving into the tale
persons or events familiar to their readers.”228 She explained that “[n]o author
should be forced into creating mythological worlds or characters wholly
divorced from reality” to avoid facing a right of publicity claim.229
The Chief Justice then stated that “an action for infringement of the right
of publicity can be maintained only if the proprietary interests at issue clearly
outweigh the value of free expression.”230 She applied that balancing inquiry
and found that
[w]hether the publication involved was factual and biographical or
fictional, the right of publicity has not been held to outweigh the
value of free expression. Any other conclusion would allow reports
and commentaries on the thoughts and conduct of public and
prominent persons to be subject to censorship under the guise of
preventing the dissipation of the publicity value of a person’s
identity.231
Thus, the First Amendment protected the use of Valentino’s name and
likeness in the film.232
225. Guglielmi, 603 P.2d at 455.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 457–62 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
228. Id. at 460 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 461 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
231. Id. at 461–62 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
232. Id. at 462 (Bird, C.J., concurring). The court also found the First Amendment protected the
use of Valentino’s name and likeness in advertisements for the film: “It would be illogical to allow
respondents to exhibit the film but effectively preclude any advance discussion or promotion of their
lawful enterprise.” Id.
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For many years after Guglielmi, California courts applied a robust First
Amendment protection against right of publicity claims in the film context
without applying a transformative use test.233 For example, in Dora v.
Frontline Video, Inc., the court of appeal held the First Amendment protected
a producer of a documentary about surfers in Malibu from a surfer’s claims
for violation of his right of publicity.234 And in Polydoros v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp., the court of appeal held the First Amendment
protected a writer and director of a fictional film that included a character
resembling the plaintiff as a child.235 The court noted that to succeed on his
claims, the plaintiff “must establish a direct connection between the use of his
name or likeness and a commercial purpose,” and the mere creation of an
expressive work for financial gain did not satisfy that requirement.236
2. Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.
In 2001, the California Supreme Court adopted the transformative use test
to a right of publicity claim.237 In Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary
Saderup, Inc., the owner of the intellectual property rights in The Three
Stooges sued an artist who had made a charcoal drawing of The Three Stooges
and sold it as a lithograph and on t-shirts.238 The court found the artist had
used the likenesses on “products, merchandise, or goods”—lithographs and tshirts—within the meaning of the California right of publicity statute.239 It
then found the case before it did “not concern commercial speech” because
the artist’s portraits were “expressive works and not an advertisement for or
endorsement of a product.”240 The First Amendment applied even though the
artist created the works for profit and for entertaining, and even though the art
appeared on “a less conventional avenue of communications.”241
The court did not stop at recognizing the “high degree of First
Amendment protection for noncommercial speech about celebrities,”
233. See Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Polydoros v.
Twentieth Cent. Fox Film Corp., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
234. Dora, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 791, 794.
235. Polydoros, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 208.
236. Id. at 209–10.
237. See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
238. Id. at 800–01.
239. Id. at 802.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 802, 804.
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however, because not “all expression that trenches on the right of publicity
receives such protection.”242 Instead, it analogized the right of publicity to
copyright law and found the state “legislature ha[d] a rational basis for
permitting celebrities and their heirs to control the commercial exploitation of
the celebrity’s likeness.”243 Thus, it searched for a test to “distinguish between
protected and unprotected expression.”244
The court reviewed copyright law’s fair use doctrine and found that a
“wholesale importation” of it “into right of publicity law would not be
advisable” because several fair use factors are not “useful for determining
whether the depiction of a celebrity likeness is protected by the First
Amendment.”245 But the court nevertheless took the first factor, “the purpose
and character of the use,” finding it “particularly pertinent to the task of
reconciling the rights of free expression and publicity.”246 The court reasoned
that
[w]hen artistic expression takes the form of a literal depiction or
imitation of a celebrity for commercial gain, directly trespassing on
the right of publicity without adding significant expression beyond
that trespass, the state law interest in protecting the fruits of artistic
labor outweighs the expressive interests of the imitative artist.247
But “when a work contains significant transformative elements, it is not only
especially worthy of First Amendment protection, but it is also less likely to
interfere with the economic interest protected by the right of publicity.”248
Thus, the court adopted the transformative use test:
[W]hen an artist is faced with a right of publicity challenge to his or
her work, he or she may raise as affirmative defense that the work is
protected by the First Amendment inasmuch as it contains significant
transformative elements or that the value of the work does not derive

242. Id. at 804.
243. Id. at 805. Thus, it appears the California Supreme Court applied a rational basis test rather
than a strict scrutiny test to the right of publicity. Id.
244. Id. at 807.
245. Id. at 807–08.
246. Id. at 808.
247. Id.
248. Id.
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primarily from the celebrity’s fame.249
The court then offered several factors to consider in applying the test: (1)
“whether the celebrity likeness is one of the ‘raw materials’ from which an
original work is synthesized, or whether the depiction or imitation of the
celebrity is the very sum and substance of the work in question”;250 (2)
whether the work is “primarily the defendant’s own expression” that is
“something other than the likeness of the celebrity”;251 (3) “whether the literal
and imitative or the creative elements predominate in the work”;252 (4)
whether “the marketability and economic value of the challenged work derive
primarily from the fame of the celebrity depicted,” or “from the creativity,
skill, and reputation of the artist”;253 and (5) whether the “artist’s skill and
talent is manifestly subordinated to the overall goal of creating a conventional
portrait of a celebrity so as to commercially exploit his or her fame.”254
Applying the transformative use test, the court found it could “discern no
significant transformative or creative contribution” by the artist, that the
artist’s “undeniable skill is manifestly subordinated to the overall goal of
creating literal, conventional depictions of The Three Stooges so as to exploit
their fame,” and that “the marketability and economic value of [the artist’s]
work derive[s] primarily from the fame of the celebrities depicted.”255 Thus,
the work failed the transformative use test.256
3. Winter v. DC Comics
Two years after Comedy III, the California Supreme Court applied the
transformative use test to comic books in Winter v. DC Comics.257 DC Comics
had published a “five-volume comic miniseries featuring ‘Jonah Hex,’ a

249. Id. at 810.
250. Id. at 809.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 810.
254. Id. The Ninth Circuit in Keller viewed Comedy III as establishing these five factors. See
Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig), 724 F.3d
1268, 1274 (9th Cir. 2013) [hereinafter Keller].
255. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 810–11.
256. Id. at 811.
257. Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 479 (Cal. 2003).
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fictional comic book ‘anti-hero.’”258 “The series contains an outlandish plot,
involving giant worm-like creatures, singing cowboys, and the ‘Wilde West
Ranch and Music and Culture Emporium . . . .’”259 Three volumes referenced
or featured the half-worm, half-human brothers Johnny and Edgar Autumn.260
Musicians Johnny and Edgar Winter sued for violation of their right of
publicity.261 The court applied the transformative use test it had adopted in
Comedy III and found (1) the comic books “are not just conventional
depictions of plaintiffs but contain significant expressive content other than
plaintiffs’ mere likenesses,” (2) plaintiffs are not depicted literally, but are
“merely part of the raw materials from which the comic books were
synthesized,” (3) any resemblance of plaintiffs is “distorted for purposes of
lampoon, parody, or caricature,” (4) “the Autumn brothers are but cartoon
characters—half-human and half-worm—in a larger story, which is itself
quite expressive,” and (5) the Winters’ “fans who want to purchase pictures
of them would find the drawings of the Autumn brothers unsatisfactory as a
substitute for conventional depictions.”262 Thus, the court concluded, the
comic books were “transformative and entitled to First Amendment
protection.”263
The court distinguished its earlier decision in Comedy III:
The artist in [Comedy III] essentially sold, and devoted fans bought,
pictures of The Three Stooges, not transformed expressive works by
the artist. Here, by contrast, defendants essentially sold, and the
buyers purchased, DC Comics depicting fanciful, creative characters,
not pictures of the Winter brothers. This makes all the difference.264

258. Id. at 476.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 479.
263. Id. at 480. The court further found that whether DC Comics was “trading on plaintiffs’
likenesses and reputations to generate interest” in the comic books was irrelevant, since “[t]he question
[was] whether the work is transformative, not how it is marketed.” Id. at 479.
264. Id. at 480. As Professor Ford explains, the court’s analysis and conclusion allow one to read
Winter as requiring “significant visual changes to a real person in order to qualify as transformative,
which makes it risky to provide realistic portrayals of real people in comic books.” So Are Games
Coffee Mugs or What?, supra note 21, at 186.
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C. California State Cases Applying the Transformative Use Test to Video
Games
1. Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc.
Not only was California the first jurisdiction to adopt the transformative
use test in right of publicity cases, it was also the first to apply the test in the
video game context when the California Court of Appeal decided Kirby v.
Sega of America, Inc.265 Kierin Kirby, “the lead singer of a retro-funk-dance
musical group known as ‘Deee-Lite’ which was popular in the early 1990’s,”
claimed Sega used her likeness as the basis for the character Ulala in Space
Channel 5, a video game first released in Japan in 1999.266 Space Channel 5
is “set in outer space in the 25th century” and features Ulala, “who works for
a news channel called Space Channel 5.”267 “In the game, Ulala is dispatched
to investigate an invasion of Earth by dance-loving aliens who shoot
earthlings with ray guns, causing them to dance uncontrollably.”268 She
“encounters the aliens and competitor reporters” during her investigation and
must “match the dance moves of the other characters.”269
After recognizing that “[v]ideo games are expressive works entitled to as
much First Amendment protection as the most profound literature,” the court
of appeal applied the transformative use test to Kirby’s right of publicity
claim.270 The court described the “inquiry [as] whether the celebrity likeness
is one of the ‘raw materials’ from which an original work is synthesized, or
whether the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very sum and
substance of the work in question.”271
The court of appeal first noted similarities between Ulala and Kirby’s
appearances: they were both “thin” with “similarly shaped eyes and faces, red
lips and red or pink hair,” and both wore “brightly-colored, form-fitting
clothing, including short skirts and platform shoes in a 1960’s retro style.”272

265. See 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
266. Id. at 609.
267. Id. at 610.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 615–16.
271. Id. at 615 (quoting Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal.
2001)).
272. Id. at 613.
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Moreover, “Ulala’s name is a phonetic variant of ‘ooh la la,’ a phrase often
used by Kirby and associated with Kirby,” and Ulala and Kirby both use some
of the same words and phrases, such as “groove,” “meow,” “dee-lish,” and “I
won’t give up.”273
But the court also found significant differences between the two.274 Their
physiques were different, and Ulala’s appearance was based on the Japanese
anime style.275 Ulala’s hairstyle and clothing also “differ[ed] from those worn
by Kirby.”276 Further, Space Channel 5 is set in 25th century outer space,
while “Kirby’s fashion approach harkens back to a retro 1960’s style, and
neither her videos nor photographs relate to outer space.”277 Finally, a
Japanese choreographer and dancer had created Ulala’s dance moves, which
were different than Kirby’s.278
The court concluded that “notwithstanding certain similarities, Ulala is
more than a mere likeness or literal depiction of Kirby.”279 The differences
between Ulala and Kirby “demonstrate Ulala is ‘transformative,’” and Sega
“added creative elements to create a new expression.”280 Thus, “Ulala
contains sufficient expressive content to constitute a ‘transformative work’
under the test articulated by the [California] Supreme Court,” and the First
Amendment protected the game from Kirby’s right of publicity claim.281
2. No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc.
Five years after Kirby, a different division of the California Court of
Appeal282 reached the opposite result in another video game case, No Doubt
v. Activision Publishing, Inc., in which the rock band No Doubt sued
Activision over the use of the bandmembers’ likenesses in Band Hero.283
273. Id.
274. Id. at 613, 616.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 616.
277. Id. at 613.
278. Id. at 609.
279. Id. at 616.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. “The California Courts of Appeal are divided into six appellate districts,” some of which “are
further divided into Divisions.”
California Courts of Appeal, CALIFORNIA COURTS,
https://www.courts.ca.gov/courtsofappeal.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2020).
283. 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 400 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). More specifically, No Doubt had “licensed
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Band Hero is a “version of Activision’s Guitar Hero franchise” that “allows
players to simulate performing in a rock band in time with popular songs.”284
Band Hero contains more than sixty popular songs and also “permits players
to create their own music.”285 Players perform the songs by using avatars to
represent them, which they can design themselves or choose from among ones
already available, including “fictional characters created and designed by
Activision” as well as “digital representations of real-life rock stars.”286
The court held that Activision’s use of No Doubt’s likenesses in Band
Hero was not transformative.287
It found Activision used “literal
reproductions” of the likenesses “so that players could choose to ‘be’ the No
Doubt rock stars,” and that Band Hero did not allow players “to alter the No
Doubt avatars”; instead, “they remain at all times immutable images of the
real celebrity musicians.”288 Although the court recognized that “even literal
reproductions of celebrities can be ‘transformed’ into expressive works based
on the context into which the celebrity image is placed,”289 it found the
“context in which Activision uses the literal likenesses of No Doubt’s
members does not qualify the use of the likenesses for First Amendment
protection.”290
The court found that, unlike Sega’s portrayal of Ulala in Space Channel
5 as a news reporter in the 25th century, the No Doubt avatars in Band Hero
“perform rock songs, the same activity by which the band achieved and
maintains its fame,” and they did so “as literal recreations of the band
members.”291 The court rejected Activision’s argument that its use of the
likenesses was transformative because the avatars could perform at “fanciful
venues including outer space,” perform songs “the real band would object to
singing,” and that the likenesses appear “in the context of a videogame that
contains many other creative elements.”292 In short, the court zeroed in on its
the likenesses of its members for use in Band Hero,” but alleged “that Activision used [their likenesses]
in objectionable ways outside the scope of the parties’ licensing agreement.” Id.
284. Id. at 401. Romantics v. Activision Publishing, Inc. discussed the Guitar Hero games. 574 F.
Supp. 2d. 758 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
285. No Doubt, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 401.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 410–12, 415.
288. Id. at 409–10.
289. Id. at 410 (citing Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 811 (Cal. 2001)).
290. Id.
291. Id. at 411.
292. Id.
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finding that the avatars were “exact depictions of No Doubt’s members doing
exactly what they do as celebrities.”293
Moreover, the court found that Activision’s use of No Doubt’s likenesses
was “motivated by the commercial interest in using the band’s fame to market
Band Hero, because it encourages the band’s sizeable fan base to purchase the
game so as to perform as, or alongside, the members of No Doubt.”294
According to the court, “insofar as the depiction of No Doubt is concerned,
the graphics and other background content of the game are secondary, and the
expressive elements of the game remain ‘manifestly subordinated to the
overall goal of creating a conventional portrait of [No Doubt] so as to
commercially exploit [its] fame.’”295 “In other words, nothing in the creative
elements of the Band Hero elevates the depictions of No Doubt to something
more than ‘conventional, more or less fungible, images’ of its members that
No Doubt should have the right to control and exploit.”296
3. Washington v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc.
This article previously discussed ESS’s lawsuit over Rockstar’s depiction
of a strip club in Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas.297 In Washington v. TakeTwo Interactive Software, Inc., Michael Washington, a “professional model”
and “back-up singer . . . in the . . . rap group ‘Cypress Hill,’” sued Rockstar
“alleging that [it] misappropriated his likeness and identity for the [main]
character” in San Andreas, Carl Johnson (CJ).298
The court of appeal began by describing San Andreas as “essentially an
animated, interactive movie.”299 Applying the transformative use test, the
court found that CJ was “‘not a literal depiction’ of Washington,”300 since CJ’s
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d
797, 811 (Cal. 2001)).
296. Id. (quoting Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 808). In Romantics, the Eastern District of Michigan
applied the Rogers test to another band’s right of publicity claim in a case involving the use of a song
in Activision’s Guitar Hero Encore: Rocks the 80s—a game very similar to Band Hero—and found
the First Amendment protected the game. See Romantics v. Activision Publ’g Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d
758, 765–766 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
297. E.S.S. Entm’t 2000 Inc., v. Rock Star Videos, 547 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2008); see supra notes
76–96 and accompanying text (discussing the case).
298. No. B232929, 2012 WL 5358709, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2012).
299. Id. at *1.
300. Id. at *11 (quoting Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 616 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)).
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“appearance is rather ‘generic’” and “there is not a single feature that ‘directly
links’ CJ to Washington, such as ‘distinctive tattoos, birthmarks or other
physical features.’”301 Further, CJ’s “physical appearance changes during the
game depending on the amount he exercises and the amount he eats,” and
nothing suggests that “CJ’s clothing or accessories, which also change
throughout the game, are based on Washington’s appearance.”302
Further, the court found San Andreas had “significant creative elements
that have no apparent connection to Washington.”303 The game takes place in
different cities, where “CJ encounters dozens (if not hundreds) of characters,
including police officers, drug dealers, gang members and members of his
own family.”304 Throughout the game, CJ also “confront[s] many social
issues, including police corruption, race relations, drug dealing, and gang
culture.”305 And none of the locations, characters, or events in San Andreas
were based on Washington’s life.306 The court also held that even if Rockstar
had used Washington’s likeness, “CJ is a ‘fanciful, creative character’ who
exists in the context of a unique and expressive video game,’” like Ulala was
in Kirby, and therefore any use would not have been the “very sum and
substance” of San Andreas, but just “one of the ‘raw materials’ from which
[the game] is synthesized.”307
Finally, the court of appeal distinguished the case before it from No
Doubt, finding that Washington had “presented no evidence demonstrating
that the plot or characters” of San Andreas had “any relevance to his life or
his purported fame,”308 whereas in No Doubt, the court had found the avatars
were “exact depictions of No Doubt’s members doing exactly what they do as
celebrities.”309

301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. (first quoting Kirby. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 618 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); then
quoting Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 477 (Cal. 2003)).
308. Id. at *12.
309. Id. (quoting No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 411 (Cal. Ct. App.
2011)).
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4. Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard
This article previously discussed AM General’s lawsuit over Activision’s
use of Humvees in the Call of Duty series, and mentioned two other district
court cases in which plaintiffs sued for trademark infringement over Call of
Duty.310 In 2014, Manuel Noriega sued Activision over the use of his likeness
in Call of Duty: Black Ops II.311 Noriega was a former general in the
Panamanian army and former dictator of Panama, who “controlled all
elements of the Panamanian government” and was involved in drug
trafficking, money laundering, and arms dealing.312 A series of escalations
between Panama and the United States led to Operation Just Cause—the U.S.
invasion of Panama—in 1989.313 Noriega was later convicted in the United
States, Panama, and France of various offenses, and he died in 2017.314
The superior court dismissed Noriega’s right of publicity claim, focusing
on several facts.315 In Black Ops II, players “assume the role of a foot soldier
placed in simulated infantry and warfare scenarios.”316 “[T]he game is set in
the context of the Cold War and incorporates clandestine CIA operations
driven by specialized Black Ops soldiers . . . .”317 The Noriega character in
Black Ops II appeared in only two of the eleven missions for “a matter of
minutes and voice[d] less than 30 lines” and was just “one of more than 45
characters, including other historical figures.”318 Moreover, players “can
never assume the Noriega character’s identity, control its movements or
experience gameplay through its eyes.”319 Activision “devoted two years,
over $100 million and a team of over 250 designers, engineers and talent to

310. See supra notes 156–174 and accompanying text.
311. Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard, Inc., No. BC 551747, 2014 WL 5930149, at *1 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Oct. 27, 2014). The caption in the order misspells Noriega’s name as Noreiga, but the register of
actions reflects the correct spelling of his name. See id.
312. Id. at *3.
313. See id.
314. See id.; see also Randal C. Archibold, Manuel Noriega, Dictator Ousted by U.S. in Panama,
Dies at 83, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/30/world/americas/
manuel-antonio-noriega-dead-panama.html.
315. Noriega, 2014 WL 5930149, at *3; see also infra notes 316–322 and accompanying text
(discussing the facts the court focused on).
316. Noriega, 2014 WL 5930149, at *3.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
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develop and produce” the game,320 and it did not use the Noriega character “in
any marketing or advertising of the game.”321
The court found that
this evidence compels the conclusion that [Activision’s] use of
Noriega’s likeness was transformative. The publicly available
photographs of Noriega used to create his avatar were part of the
extensive “raw materials” from which the game was synthetized.
Noriega’s depiction was not the “very sum and substance” of the
work. The complex and multi-faceted game is a product of
defendants’ own expression, with de minimis use of Noriega’s
likeness. . . . [T]he marketability and economic value of the [game]
. . . comes not from Noriega, but from the creativity, skill and
reputation of [Activision].322
5. A Non-Video Game Case for Comparison: de Havilland v. FX
Networks, LLC
In de Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC, actress Olivia de Havilland alleged
the creators and producers of Feud: Bette and Joan violated her right of
publicity.323 Feud is a “docudrama about film stars Bette Davis and Joan
Crawford,” in which Catherine Zeta-Jones portrays de Havilland, “a close
friend of Davis.”324
The court of appeal first concluded that the First Amendment protected
FX’s use of de Havilland’s likeness in Feud even without applying the
transformative use test.325 Citing Sarver v. Chartier, the court found Feud “is
speech that is fully protected by the First Amendment, which safeguards the
storytellers and artists who take the raw materials of life—including the
stories of real individuals, ordinary or extraordinary—and transform them into
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. at *4. As Professor Ford has explained, the Noriega court’s focus on the game as a whole
is consistent with Comedy III, but inconsistent with No Doubt. See So Are Games Coffee Mugs or
What?, supra note 21, at 197–98. But Noriega apparently did not appeal the superior court’s decision,
so the court of appeal lacked the opportunity to address the inconsistency between the trial court’s
decision and No Doubt.
323. 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625, 630 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 800 (2019).
324. Id. at 630–31.
325. See id. at 638.
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art, be it articles, books, movies, or plays.”326 The court provided several
examples where creators of expressive works could portray real people
without acquiring their rights:
The creators of The People v. O.J. Simpson: American Crime Story
can portray Trial Judge Lance Ito without acquiring his rights.
Fruitvale Station’s writer and director Ryan Coogler can portray Bay
Area Rapid Transit officer Johannes Mehserle without acquiring his
rights. HBO can portray Sarah Palin in Game Change (HBO 2013)
without acquiring her rights.327
Turning to the transformative use test, the court first questioned its
applicability to films: “Comedy III’s ‘transformative’ test makes sense when
applied to products and merchandise—‘tangible personal property,’ in the
Supreme Court’s words. Lower courts have struggled mightily, however, to
figure out how to apply it to expressive works such as films, plays, and
television programs.”328 Nevertheless, the court applied the test and disagreed
with the trial court’s finding that there was “nothing transformative about the
docudrama” simply because FX “wanted to make the appearance of [de
Havilland] as real as possible.”329
The court of appeal pointed out several factors that made the use
transformative. First, “[t]he de Havilland role . . . constitutes about 4.2 percent
of Feud,” a miniseries that focuses on the competition between Bette Davis
and Joan Crawford but also tells many other stories.330 Second, FX used de
Havilland’s likeness as “one of the ‘raw materials’ from which [the] original
work [Feud] [was] synthesized,” and “Feud’s ‘marketability and economic
value’ [did] not ‘derive primarily from [de Havilland’s] fame’ but rather
‘[came] principally from . . . the creativity, skill, and reputation’ of Feud’s

326. Id. (quoting Sarver v. Chartier, 813 F.3d 891, 905 (9th Cir. 2016)).
327. Id. at 639. Likewise, “[y]ou are entitled to write (and sell) your own unauthorized biography
of Arnold Schwarzenegger, whether or not there’s already an authorized biography that adequately
covers the territory.” Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 HOUS. L.
REV. 903, 923 (2003); cf. Restoring Rogers, supra note 21, at 312 (discussing the use of trademarks
in films).
328. de Havilland, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 641 (citation omitted) (quoting Comedy III Prods., Inc. v.
Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 802 (Cal. 2001)).
329. Id. (alteration in original).
330. Id.
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creators and actors.”331 In short, the court found, “Feud constitutes
‘significant expression’—a story of two Hollywood legends—of which the de
Havilland character is but a small part.”332
D. Federal Cases Applying the Transformative Use Test to Video Games
Several federal cases have applied the transformative use test to right of
publicity claims in video games. Three discussed below involve the use of
likenesses in realistic sports games and have shifted the law greatly towards
protecting the right of publicity at the cost of the First Amendment. The other
two found the use of an individual’s likeness sufficiently transformed, but
only in games where realism was not a goal.
1. Hart v. Electronic Arts
In EA’s NCAA Football, players can choose a “basic single-game format”
where two college football teams play against each other, or other game
modes such as the “Dynasty Mode” that “allows [players] to ‘control[] a
college program for up to thirty seasons,’ including ‘year-round
responsibilities of a college coach’”; or the “Race for the Heisman” (or
“Campus Legend”) mode that allows players to control a virtual high school
football player “through his collegiate career, making his or her own choices
regarding practices, academics and social activities.”333
NCAA Football owed its success to “its focus on realism and detail—from
realistic sounds, to game mechanics, to team mascots.”334 As part of that
realism, the game has “‘over 100 virtual teams’ . . . populated by digital
avatars that resemble their real-life counterparts and share their vital and
biographical information.”335 Players can change an avatar’s appearance and
vital statistics, but other details remain unchangeable.336 “Thus, for example,
in NCAA Football 2006, Rutgers’ quarterback, player number 13, is 6’2” tall,
weighs 197 pounds and resembles [Ryan] Hart,” a quarterback, player number

331.
810).
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
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Id. (first, second, fifth, and seventh alterations in original) (quoting Comedy III, 21 P.3d at
Id.
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2013) (second alteration in original).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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13, who played for Rutgers “for the 2002 through 2005 seasons.”337 And Hart
sued EA for using his likeness and biographical information in NCAA
Football under New Jersey’s right of publicity law.338
The Third Circuit surveyed the different tests that courts used over the
years to balance First Amendment protections with right of publicity
claims.339 It analyzed whether to apply “the commercial-interest-based
Predominant Use Test, the trademark-based Rogers Test, [or] the copyrightbased Transformative Use Test.”340 In a lengthy analysis, the court declined
to adopt either of the first two and instead opted to apply the transformative
use test.341
Applying the transformative use test, the court focused on “whether
[Hart’s] identity is sufficiently transformed in NCAA Football.”342 First, it
found the “digital avatar’s appearance and the biographical and identifying
information” closely resembled Hart.343 Second, the court found the avatar
“does what the actual Ryan Hart did while at Rutgers: he plays college
football, in digital recreations of college football stadiums, filled with all the
trappings of a college football game.”344 The court found these elements were
not transformative because they did not change Hart’s “identity in a
significant way.”345 Third, the court found the players’ ability to alter the
avatar’s appearance insufficient to meet the transformative use test because
EA’s goal in NCAA Football was to “create a realistic depiction of college
football,” part of which “involves generating realistic representations of the
various college teams—which includes the realistic representations of the
players.”346 Because realism is “central to the core of the game experience,”
the ability for players to change the avatar’s appearance was not enough to
transform Hart’s likeness.347 Finally, the court rejected EA’s argument that
other creative elements of NCAA Football should be considered, and limited

337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

Id. at 146, 145.
Id. at 145.
See id. at 152–65.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 153–65.
Id. at 165.
Id. at 166.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 168.
Id.
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its analysis only to elements of the game that “in some way[] affect the use or
meaning of [Hart’s] identity.”348
Judge Ambro dissented.349 He made two key points. First, he found the
majority unduly limited “their transformative inquiry to Hart’s identity alone,
disregarding other features of the work.”350 Rather, in applying the
transformative use test, “it is necessary to review the likeness in the context
of the work in its entirety, rather than focusing only on the individual’s
likeness.”351
Second, Judge Ambro found the majority had “penalize[d] EA for the
realism and financial success of NCAA Football,” and that decision cannot be
reconciled with “First Amendment protections traditionally afforded to trueto-life depictions of real figures and works produced for profit.”352 The First
Amendment protects “biographies, documentaries, docudramas, and other
expressive works depicting real-life figures, whether the accounts are factual
or fictional.”353 Moreover, the sale of expressive works for profit does not
diminish First Amendment protections, which apply equally to video games
as to other expressive works.354
Thus, EA’s use of real-life likenesses as “characters” in its NCAA
Football video game should be as protected as portrayals (fictional
or nonfictional) of individuals in movies and books. . . . And . . .
[any] profit flow[ing] from EA’s realistic depiction of Hart (and the
myriad other college football players portrayed in NCAA Football) is
not constitutionally significant, nor even an appropriate
consideration.355
Applying his understanding of the transformative use test, Judge Ambro
concluded that “EA’s use of avatars resembling actual players is entitled to
First Amendment protection.”356 He referenced the “original graphics, videos,
sound effects, and game scenarios” in the game; players’ ability “to direct the
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
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Id. at 169.
Id. at 170 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 173 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
Id. at 173–74 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
Id. at 174 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
Id.

[Vol. 48: 425, 2021]

Protecting the First Amendment Rights of Video Games
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

play of a college football team whose players may be based on a current roster,
a past roster, or an entirely imaginary roster comprised of made-up players”;
that players “are not reenacting real games, but rather are directing the avatars
in invented games and seasons”; and that players can “control virtual players
and teams for multiple seasons, creating the means by which they can generate
their own narratives.”357
2. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation
(Keller)
At the same time the Third Circuit considered Hart, the Ninth Circuit
faced a materially identical case in Keller, where several college football
players (including Samuel Keller) sued EA for using their likenesses in NCAA
Football.358 Like the Third Circuit, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Rogers test
in favor of the transformative use test.359 It identified five factors from the
California Supreme Court’s decision in Comedy III to analyze in determining
whether the use of a likeness is sufficiently transformative.360 Ultimately, the
court’s analysis mirrored that of the Third Circuit’s in Hart, and it reached the
same conclusion—that EA’s use of college football players’ likenesses in
NCAA Football was not transformative because “NCAA Football realistically
portrays college football players in the context of college football games.”361
In yet another similarity, Judge Thomas dissented in Keller just as Judge
Ambro dissented in Hart.362 Judge Thomas found the First Amendment
protected NCAA Football “because the creative and transformative elements”
of the game “predominate over the commercial use of the athletes’
likenesses.”363 Judge Thomas argued that the “majority confines its inquiry
to how a single athlete’s likeness is represented in the video game, rather than
examining the transformative and creative elements in the video game as a

357. Id. at 175 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
358. Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.),
724 F.3d 1268, 1274 (9th Cir. 2013).
359. Id. at 1279–82. The Ninth Circuit found that the “history and development of the Rogers test
makes clear[] [that] it was designed to protect consumers from the risk of consumer confusion,” and
“[t]he right of publicity protects the celebrity, not the consumer.” Id. at 1280–81.
360. Id. at 1274. For the five factors, see supra notes 250–254 and accompanying text.
361. Keller, 724 F.3d at 1279.
362. Id. at 1284 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
363. Id.
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whole.”364 According to Judge Thomas, the majority’s approach “contradicts
the holistic analysis required by the transformative use test,”365 which asks
“whether the entire work is transformative, and whether the transformative
elements predominate, rather than whether an individual persona or image has
been altered.”366
Judge Thomas described NCAA Football as a “work of interactive
historical fiction” that allows the player to roleplay as a potential college
football player or a football coach.367 The game also gives the player the
power to alter the virtual players’ “abilities, appearances, and physical
characteristics,” and even “create new virtual players.”368 Moreover, players
can change teams and environmental factors such as “weather, crowd noise,
[and] mascots.”369 Even if the player simply plays an unaltered version of the
game, “the work is one of historic[al] fiction” because the “gamer controls the
teams, players, and games.”370 Thus, “considered as a whole,” NCAA Football
is “primarily one of EA’s own expression,” with “[t]he athletic likenesses . . .
[merely] one of the raw materials from which the broader game is
constructed.”371
Indeed, the “creative and transformative elements
predominate over the commercial use of likenesses”; the “marketability and
economic value of the game comes from” its “creative elements, not from . . .
[any] commercial exploitation of a celebrity”; and “[t]he game is not a
conventional portrait of a celebrity, but a work consisting of many creative
and transformative elements.”372
Moreover, Judge Thomas found the depiction of football players in NCAA
Football more akin to the depiction of Ulala in Kirby than to the depiction of
the band in No Doubt.373 While he distinguished No Doubt on the ground that
the “literal representations in No Doubt were not, and could not be,
transformed in any way,”374 he also noted that, “to the extent that the Court of
364. Id. at 1285 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
365. Id. (citing Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 170–76 (3d. Cir. 2013) (Ambro, J.,
dissenting)).
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 1286.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 1286–87.
374. Id. at 1286.
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Appeal’s opinion in No Doubt may be read to be in tension with the
transformative use test as articulated by the California Supreme Court in
Comedy III and Winter, it must yield.”375 Thus, Judge Thomas “would not
punish EA for the realism of its games and for the skill of the artists who
created realistic settings for the football games.”376
Judge Thomas went even further. Among other things, he focused on
Comedy III’s requirement that courts examine “whether the source of the
product marketability comes from creative elements or from pure exploitation
of a celebrity image.”377 “NCAA Football includes not just Sam Keller, but
thousands of virtual actors,” and “one could play NCAA Football thousands
of times without ever encountering a particular avatar.”378 The “sheer number
of athletes involved inevitably diminish[es] the significance of the publicity
right at issue” and “underscores the inappropriateness of analyzing the right
of publicity through the lens of one likeness only.”379
Finally, Judge Thomas warned that “[t]he logical consequence of the
majority view is that all realistic depictions of actual persons, no matter how
incidental, are protected by a state law right of publicity regardless of the
creative context.”380 This result would “jeopardize[] the creative use of
historic figures in motion pictures, books, and sound recordings,” and “cannot
be reconciled with the many cases affording such works First Amendment
protection.”381

375. Id. at 1287 n.3.
376. Id. at 1287.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 1287–88.
379. Id. Judge Thomas’s discussion of No Doubt, unfortunately, is inaccurate. See id. at 1288. He
suggests “Kirby and No Doubt involved pivotal characters in a video game” where “[t]he commercial
image of the celebrities in each case was central to the production, and its contact with the consumer
was immediate and unavoidable.” Id. That was true in Kirby since Ulala is the main protagonist in
Space Channel 5. Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 610 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). But in
No Doubt, players could play Band Hero without ever encountering the likenesses of No Doubt’s
members, who represented only one of the many choices players had in deciding upon the avatars to
represent their band. See No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 400 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2011).
380. Keller, 724 F.3d at 1290 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
381. Id. The majority responded that its analysis “leaves room for distinguishing between this
case—where we have emphasized EA’s primary emphasis on reproducing reality—and cases
involving other kinds of expressive works.” Id. at 1279 n.10. This very statement suggests there is a
distinction between video games and other expressive works and shows the majority views video
games as less deserving of First Amendment protection than those other works. See infra Section V.B.
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3. Davis v. Electronic Arts, Inc.
Davis v. Electronic Arts, in which former NFL players sued EA for using
their likenesses in Madden NFL,382 is nearly identical to Brown v. Electronic
Arts.383 But while Brown sued under the Lanham Act,384 the plaintiffs in Davis
sued under a state law right of publicity theory.385 And that made all the
difference: The Ninth Circuit found the facts and arguments were largely
indistinguishable from Keller, and held it was bound by its previous
decision.386 Thus, the court declined to apply the Rogers test, and instead
applied the transformative use test and concluded EA’s use of the players’
likenesses in Madden NFL was not transformative.387
4. Hamilton v. Speight
In Hamilton v. Speight, Lenwood Hamilton, a former professional
wrestler and football player, alleged the publishers of the Gears of War video
games used his wrestling identity Hard Rock Hamilton to create the character
Augustus Cole.388 “Gears of War is an extremely violent cartoon-style fantasy
video game series. The series takes place on an Earth-like planet called Sera
that is populated by a wide variety of post-apocalyptic, crumbling
structures.”389 The games mainly follow “a military unit called Delta Squad,”
which includes Cole, and its conflicts with “a race of exotic reptilian
humanoids known as the Locust Horde.”390
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania applied the transformative use test

382. Davis v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 775 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 2015).
383. Compare Davis, 775 F.3d at 1175 (“We are called upon to balance the right of publicity of
former professional football players against Electronic Arts’ (EA) First Amendment right to use their
likenesses in its Madden NFL series of video games.”), with Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235,
1238 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[R]etired professional football player Jim[] Brown[] . . . alleg[ed] that
Electronic Arts, Inc., violated § 43 of the Lanham Act through the use of his likeness in its Madden
NFL series of video games.”).
384. Brown, 724 F.3d at 1238.
385. Davis, 775 F.3d at 1176.
386. Id. at 1178.
387. Id. at 1177–79.
388. Hamilton v. Speight, 413 F. Supp. 3d 423, 425–27 (E.D. Pa. 2019), aff’d, No. 19-3495, 2020
WL 5569454 (3d Cir. Sept. 10, 2020).
389. Id. at 426.
390. Id.

476

[Vol. 48: 425, 2021]

Protecting the First Amendment Rights of Video Games
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

and found Cole was transformative for two reasons.391 First, while Hamilton
and Cole shared some physical similarities, Hamilton’s identity was
“obviously not the ‘very sum and substance’ of the Cole character’s
identity.”392 Cole’s biographical information, clothing, and persona were all
different from Hamilton’s.393 “Second, the context in which the Cole
character appears and performs is profoundly transformative” because Cole
“engages in extraordinarily stylized and fantastical violence against
cartoonish reptilian humanoids on a fictional planet in a fictional war [and]
‘does not do[] what the actual’ . . . Hamilton . . . does—engage in professional
wrestling on Earth.”394 In short, the court found, the case before it was nearly
identical to Kirby.395
In a short unpublished opinion, the Third Circuit affirmed the district
court’s order.396 The court found that “no reasonable jury could conclude that
Hamilton—whether Lenwood or Hard Rock—is the ‘sum and substance’ of
the Augustus Cole character.”397 Although it found some similarities, it also
found other “significant differences” that “reveal that Hamilton was, at most,
one of the ‘raw materials from which [Augustus Cole] was synthesized.’”398
In particular, Hamilton does not “fight[] a fantastic breed of creatures in a
fictional world,” has never served in the military, and “admits that the Cole
character’s persona is alien to him.”399 In short, the Third Circuit concluded,
“[i]f Hamilton was the inspiration for Cole, the likeness has been ‘so
transformed that it has become primarily the defendant’s own expression.’”400
5. Pellegrino v. Epic Games, Inc.
In 2017, Epic Games released the battle royale game Fortnite.401 The
battle royale genre “blends the survival, exploration and scavenging elements
of a survival game with last-man-standing gameplay,” where “‘up to 100
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.

Id. at 431.
Id. at 431; see also id. at 431–33 (discussing this holding in more detail).
Id. at 431–32.
Id. at 431 (second alteration in original).
See id. at 432.
Hamilton v. Speight, No. 19-3495, 2020 WL 5569454 (3d Cir. Sept. 17, 2020).
Id. at *2 (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Pellegrino v. Epic Games, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 3d 373, 378 (E.D. Pa. 2020).
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players, alone, in pairs or in groups, compete to be the last player or group
alive’ by using weapons and other forms of violence to eliminate other
players.”402 In 2018 and 2019, numerous plaintiffs sued Epic claiming it used
their dance moves as emotes403 in Fortnite without permission.404 The initial
battle resulted in the plaintiffs withdrawing their copyright claims, and some
plaintiffs dismissing their cases altogether.405 A few, however, continued to
pursue their trademark and right of publicity claims—including Leo
Pellegrino, who alleged Epic’s “Phone It In” emote constituted unauthorized
use of his likeness by using his “Signature Move” dance.406
In March 2020, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted Epic’s
motion to dismiss on all claims but one—Pellegrino’s false endorsement
claim.407 As for Pellegrino’s right of publicity claims, the court applied the
transformative use test the Third Circuit adopted in Hart.408 It found Epic had
sufficiently transformed Pellegrino’s likeness in at least two ways: Fortnite
avatars “do not share Pellegrino’s identity nor do what Pellegrino does in real
life.”409 Fortnite avatars using the “Phone It In” emote do not “share
Pellegrino’s appearance or biographical information.”410 Moreover, Fortnite
402. Id.
403. Id. Emotes are “customizations for the Fortnite digital avatars” that enable them to “perform
dances or movements.” Id. (emphasis added). Emotes are popular because they “allow players to
personalize their Fornite experience.” Id. (emphasis added).
404. See id. At least seven lawsuits were filed against Epic. See Pellegrino, 2020 WL 1531867
(“Signature Move” dance); Brantley v. Epic Games, Inc., No. 8:19-cv-00594-PWG (D. Md. Filed Feb.
25, 2019) (“Running Man” dance); Baker v. Epic Games, Inc., No. 2:19-cv-00505 (C.D. Cal. Filed
Jan. 23, 2019) (“Shoot” dance); McCumbers v. Epic Games, Inc., No. 2:19-cv-00260 (C.D. Cal. Filed
Jan. 11, 2019) (“Random” dance); Redd v. Epic Games, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-10444 (C.D. Cal. Filed Dec.
17, 2018) (“Floss Dance”); Ribeiro v. Epic Games, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-10412 (C.D. Cal. filed Dec. 17,
2018) (“Carlton” dance); Ferguson v. Epic Games, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-10110 (C.D. Cal. filed Dec. 5,
2018) (“Milly Rock” dance). Several of these plaintiffs also filed similar lawsuits against Take-Two
over dance emotes in NBA 2K. See Ferguson v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., No. 2:18-cv10425 (C.D. Cal. Filed Dec. 17, 2018); Ribeiro v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., No. 2:18-cv10417 (C.D. Cal. Filed Dec. 17, 2018); Redd v. Take-Two Interactive, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-10441 (C.D.
Cal. Filed Dec. 17, 2018).
405. See generally, e.g., Meaghan H. Kent et al., Gaming Emote Litigation: Battle Royale Ensues
Over Fortnite Emotes with Plaintiffs Testing Different Causes of Action, VENABLE LLP (Apr. 21,
2020),
https://www.venable.com/insights/publications/2020/04/gaming-emote-litigation-battleroyale-ensues-over (discussing the various copyright claims).
406. Pellegrino, 451 F. Supp. 3d at 378–79.
407. Id. at 391–92.
408. Id. at 380–81.
409. Id. at 381.
410. Id.
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avatars fight in a battle royale and use emotes “amidst ‘us[ing] weapons and
violence to eliminate the competition,’” while Pellegrino is a “musical
performer who executes his Signature Move at musical performances.”411
While the court did not directly address whether the creative and
transformative elements predominate over the commercial use of Pellegrino’s
likeness, or whether the marketability and economic value of Fortnite came
from its creative elements or from the commercial exploitation of Pellegrino’s
image, the court did note that “Fortnite players can customize their avatars
with ‘new characters’ and a variety of emotes mimicking celebrities other than
Pellegrino.”412
6. A Non-Video Game Case for Comparison: Sarver v. Chartier
In 2004, journalist Mark Boal was embedded with a U.S. Army Explosive
Ordnance Disposal team in Iraq.413 He followed and took photographs and
videos of Army Sergeant Jeffrey Sarver, and he also interviewed Sarver after
their return to the United States.414 “Boal later wrote the screenplay for the
film . . . The Hurt Locker,” which follows the protagonist William James and
a U.S. Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal team in Iraq.415 Sarver sued for
violation of his right of publicity, alleging his likeness was used to create
James.416
In contrast to Keller and Davis, the Ninth Circuit did not apply the
transformative use test in Sarver before holding that the First Amendment
barred Sarver’s claim.417 The court found “California’s right of publicity law
clearly restricts speech based upon its content,” and therefore is
“presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government
proves that [it is] narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.”418 The
411. Id. (alteration in original).
412. Id. (italics added). In May 2020, the District of Maryland dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims
against Epic in Brantley on copyright preemption grounds without reaching Epic’s First Amendment
arguments. Brantley v. Epic Games, Inc., No. 8:19-cv-594-PWG, 2020 WL 2794016, at *1 (D. Md.
May 29, 2020).
413. Sarver v. Chartier, 813 F.3d 891, 896 (9th Cir. 2016).
414. Id.
415. Id. For a review of the film, see Peter Bradshaw, The Hurt Locker, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 28,
2009, 3:25 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/film/2009/aug/28/the-hurt-locker-review.
416. Sarver, 813 F.3d at 896.
417. See id. at 905–06.
418. Id. at 903 (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015)).
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court then held that the state’s interest in permitting a right of publicity claim
can survive strict scrutiny only if the defendant’s work “appropriates the
economic value of a performance or persona or seeks to capitalize off a
celebrity’s image in commercial advertisements.”419 It found “The Hurt
Locker is not speech proposing a commercial transaction” and that telling
Sarver’s story did not steal his “‘entire act’ or otherwise exploit[] the
economic value of any performance or persona he had worked to develop.”420
Thus, The Hurt Locker was “fully protected by the First Amendment, which
safeguards the storytellers and artists who take the raw materials of life—
including the stories of real individuals, ordinary or extraordinary—and
transform them into art, be it articles, books, movies, or plays.”421
V. A BETTER TEST TO BALANCE THE FIRST AMENDMENT WITH THE RIGHT
OF PUBLICITY
A. The Need to Apply Strict Scrutiny and a Consistent Test that Respects
the First Amendment’s Protection of Video Games
The preceding parts discussed two different legal theories that often result
in different outcomes despite involving similar facts. For claims arising from
the Lanham Act, courts apply the Rogers test and often conclude the First
Amendment protects the video game from the plaintiff’s claim.422 By
contrast, for right of publicity claims, courts apply the transformative use test
and often reach the opposite conclusion.423 This contrast is best highlighted
in Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc. and Davis v. Electronic Arts, Inc. In both
cases, former NFL players sued EA over the use of their likenesses in Madden
NFL. But Brown brought his claim under the Lanham Act, while Davis
brought his claim under the right of publicity. That made all the difference.424
419. Id. at 905.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. See, e.g., Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1248 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Brown’s Lanham
Act claim is thus subject to the Rogers test, and we agree with the district court that Brown has failed
to allege sufficient facts to make out a plausible claim that survives that test.”).
423. See, e.g., Davis v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 775 F.3d 1172, 1181 (9th Cir. 2015) (“EA has not shown
that its unauthorized use of former players’ likenesses in the Madden NFL video game series qualifies
for First Amendment protection under the transformative use defense.”).
424. Compare Brown, 724 F.3d at 1248 (“Brown’s Lanham Act claim is thus subject to the Rogers
test, and we agree with the district court that Brown has failed to allege sufficient facts to make out a
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The Ninth Circuit found the First Amendment protected Madden NFL against
Brown’s claim but not against Davis’s claim. And after Brown lost his appeal
on his Lanham Act claim in the Ninth Circuit, he filed a right of publicity
claim in state court—and won.425
The different results in these cases make some theoretical sense. The
Lanham Act’s goals are to prevent consumer confusion and to protect mark
owners and individuals from false advertising or endorsement, while the right
of publicity seeks to protect a form of intellectual property right in an
individual.426 Thus, the right of publicity offers broader protections than the
Lanham Act does.427 But this in fact means courts should give more, not less,
weight to the First Amendment in the right of publicity context. Indeed, courts
have recognized that “publicity rights carry a greater danger of impinging on
First Amendment rights than do rights” under the Lanham Act.428 By
prohibiting expression that includes another’s name or likeness, the right of
publicity is a content-based restriction on speech that should be subject to
strict scrutiny.429 Any test balancing the right of publicity with the First
plausible claim that survives that test.”), with Davis, 775 F.3d at 1181 (“EA has not shown that its
unauthorized use of former players’ likenesses in the Madden NFL video game series qualifies for
First Amendment protection under the transformative use defense.”).
425. See After Being Tripped Up By the Lanham Act, Jim Brown Rushes at Electronic Arts with a
Right of Publicity Claim, CROWELL & MORING (Oct. 24, 2013), https://www.crowell.com/
NewsEvents/AlertsNewsletters/all/After-Being-Tripped-Up-By-the-Lanham-Act-Jim-BrownRushes-at-Electronic-Arts-with-a-Right-of-Publicity-Claim; NFL Legend Jim Brown Takes Judgment
in Likeness Case Against Electronic Arts, HAGENS BERMAN (June 27, 2016), https://www.hbsslaw.
com/cases/jim-brown-publicity-rights/pressrelease/jim-brown-publicity-rights-nfl-legend-jimbrown-takes-judgment-in-likeness-case-against-electronic-arts.
426. See THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 202, §§ 5:6–5:9 (describing
differences between trademark rights and rights of publicity).
427. See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 460 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Because a plaintiff bears a
reduced burden of persuasion to succeed in a right of publicity action, courts and commentators have
recognized that publicity rights carry a greater danger of impinging on First Amendment rights than
do rights associated with false advertising claims.”); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball
Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 967 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Although publicity rights are related to laws
preventing false endorsement, they offer substantially broader protection[s].”); Rogers v. Grimaldi,
875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Because the right of publicity, unlike the Lanham Act, has no
likelihood of confusion requirement, it is potentially more expansive than the Lanham Act.”).
428. Parks, 329 F.3d at 460.
429. See Sarver v. Chartier, 813 F.3d 891, 903 (9th Cir. 2016); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg
Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 461–62 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring). Many commentators have adopted
this view. See, e.g., Mark Conrad, A New First Amendment Goal Line Defense—Stopping the Right
of Publicity Offense, 40 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 743, 789 (2014); F. Jay Dougherty, All the World’s Not A
Stooge: The ‘Transformativeness’ Test for Analyzing a First Amendment Defense to a Right of
Publicity Claim Against Distribution of a Work of Art, 27 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 1, 46, 61 (2003);
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Amendment must reflect this.430
Despite their differences, the Lanham Act and the right of publicity do
share some similarities. Both grant an individual the right to protect an
economic interest in their name and likeness, and both require courts to
balance the respective right against the First Amendment. Thus, while a
Lanham Act claim is not necessarily “the federal equivalent of the right of
publicity,”431 their similarities merit consideration of a single test applicable
to both types of claims.432
B. Criticism of the Transformative Use Test in the Video Game Context
and Courts’ Failure to Treat Video Games as Expressive Works
Several commentators have proposed applying the transformative use test
to Lanham Act claims as well as right of publicity claims in the video game
context.433 For example, proposals have been made (1) to use the
transformative use test for both types of claims,434 (2) to add the
transformative use test to the Rogers test and then to apply that modified test
to both Lanham Act and right of publicity claims,435 and (3) to combine the
transformative use test and a “modified likelihood of confusion test”436 when
evaluating Lanham Act claims, while leaving the transformative use test alone
when evaluating right of publicity claims.437
Proposals to use the transformative use test in Lanham Act claims fail to
give sufficient weight to the First Amendment. Indeed, the transformative use
test should not apply to video games at all, regardless of whether the plaintiff
Volokh, supra note 327, at 912 n.35; Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of
Publicity?, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 35, 53–54 (1998).
430. See supra note 429 and accompanying text. This is one of the areas in which the Ninth Circuit
failed in Keller. Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing
Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013). It recognized the Rogers test provides a “broader First
Amendment defense,” but rejected it in favor of the transformative use test. Id. at 1279.
431. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 924 (6th Cir. 2003).
432. See Ford & Liebler, supra note 21, at 80–81.
433. See Papazian, supra note 9; Kimberly Rubin, The Key to Being a Good Referee: The Call the
Ninth Circuit Missed when Evaluating False Endorsement Claims, 64 EMORY L.J. 1389 (2015);
Wesley W. Wintermyer, Who Framed Rogers v. Grimaldi?: What Protects Trademark Holders
Against First Amendment Immunity for Video Games?, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1243 (2013).
434. Wintermyer, supra note 433, at 1256–61.
435. Papazian, supra note 9, at 596–602.
436. Rubin, supra note 433, at 1393.
437. Rubin, supra note 433, at 1423–27.

482

[Vol. 48: 425, 2021]

Protecting the First Amendment Rights of Video Games
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

alleges a Lanham Act claim or a right of publicity claim.438 The California
Court of Appeal said in de Havilland that the transformative use test “makes
sense when applied to products and merchandise” but suggested it makes less
sense when applied to “expressive works such as films, plays, and television
programs.”439 Likewise, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sarver confirms the
transformative use test is unnecessary to balance the First Amendment with
the right of publicity for expressive works.440
The result the transformative use test would have on games depicting reallife scenarios or real people further shows the impropriety of applying that test
to expressive works such as video games.441 Realism alone is a legitimate
artistic goal, and the use of a likeness in an expressive work to achieve realism
has expressive value.442 But under the transformative use test, that selfsame
goal would defeat a video game publisher’s First Amendment rights.443 The
more accurate and real a depiction of a likeness, the less transformative it
necessarily will be.444 One need not look further than No Doubt, Hart, Keller,
and Davis for examples involving realistic depictions of people.445 But a test
that punishes realism in video games cannot be squared with the protection
given to realistic depictions in other expressive works, suggesting the
transformative use test has no place here.446
438. See, e.g., Geoffrey F. Palachuk, Transformative Use Test Cannot Keep Pace with Evolving
Arts, 16 U. DEN. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 233, 259, 277 (2014) (“The transformative use test . . . is not the
correct test. That test will result in incoherent and inconsistent application, and chill First Amendment
protections granted by the United States Constitution.”); Wee Jin Yeo, Disciplining the Right of
Publicity’s Nebulous First Amendment Defense with Teachings from Trademark Law, 34 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 401, 426, 439–40 (2016) (delineating the inadequacies of the transformative use
test).
439. de Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625, 641 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 800 (2019).
440. See supra notes 418–421 and accompanying text.
441. See Thomas E. Kadri, Fumbling the First Amendment: The Right of Publicity Goes 2–0 Against
Freedom of Expression, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1519, 1525 (2014) (“The transformative use test is
unwieldy and verbose. It tempts courts to judge the artistic value of expressive works in a manner that
censors speech and belittles our rich First Amendment tradition.”); infra notes 442–446.
442. See, e.g., Brown v. Elec. Arts, 724 F.3d 1235, 1243 (9th Cir. 2013); AM Gen. LLC v.
Activision Blizzard, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 3d 467, 484–85 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
443. See Kadri, supra note 441, at 1525–26.
444. See de Havilland, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 630.
445. See Davis v. Elec. Arts, Inc. 775 F.3d 1172, 1177–78 (9th Cir. 2015); Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc.
(In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268, 1276–79 (9th Cir.
2013); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 165–69 (3d Cir. 2013); No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g,
Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 400–01 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
446. See, e.g., de Havilland, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 630. A company seeking a realistic depiction of a
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As a practical problem, the transformative use test stifles creativity and
creates a chilling effect over any video game (indeed, any expressive work)
that depicts real-life scenarios or real people.447 History shows many
examples of threats over depictions of entities or individuals in films that
resulted in changes that might be less accurate.448 One can only imagine if
individuals depicted in The People v. O.J. Simpson: American Crime Story
could have prevented its creators from telling that story without portraying
them or their families more favorably.449 These tactics also occur in the video
game context. One commentator cites VIRAG in discussing “trademark
bullies” who use litigation “as a weapon to silence content creators”—or to
extract large settlements.450 Another example is the demand by Pinkerton
Consulting & Investigations for royalties from Rockstar and Take-Two for
each copy of Red Dead Redemption 2 sold, after news broke about the revenue
and sales numbers the game had achieved.451 And perhaps the best examples
person already has incentive to work with the person to ensure an accurate depiction, as seen in one
recent example involving Activision Blizzard approaching Tu Lam to collaborate on incorporating his
likeness as Daniel “Ronin” Shinoda into Call of Duty: Modern Warfare. See James Mattone, The Real
Ronin: An Interview with Tu Lam, ACTIVISION GAMES BLOG (Apr. 28, 2020), https://blog.
activision.com/call-of-duty/2020-04/The-Real-Ronin-An-Interview-with-Tu-Lam. Works intending
to accurately depict real events or people but failing to do so will often receive criticism for that very
reason. See Anthony Zangrillo, The Split on the Rogers v. Grimaldi Gridiron: An Analysis of
Unauthorized Trademark Use in Artistic Mediums, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
385, 388–89 (2017) (delineating the horrible reviews a film received after having to alter the events
portrayed in the film so as not to depict real events without being “transformative”).
447. See Kadri, supra note 441, at 1528–29; infra notes 450–452 and accompanying text.
448. See Zangrillo, supra note 446, at 388–89.
449. See, e.g., Joanna Robinson, Mark Fuhrman Slams The People v. O.J. Simpson for Political
Correctness, VANITY FAIR (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2016/03/markfuhrman-people-v-oj-simpson. In this article, Mark Fuhrman, the LAPD Detective who found the
famous bloody glove, suggested the TV series does not accurately portray him and complained that
FX “is attempting to establish a historical artifact with this series without reaching out to any
prosecution sources.” Id.
450. Zangrillo, supra note 446, at 423–24.
451. See Press Release, Red Dead Redemption 2 Achieves Entertainment’s Biggest Opening
Weekend of All Time, BUS. WIRE (Oct. 30, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.businesswire.
com/news/home/20181030005459/en. In late October 2018, Rockstar announced that Red Dead
Redemption 2 had sold more than $725 million in the first three days of its release and set multiple
records. Id. Less than two months later, Pinkerton sent the cease and desist letter to Rockstar and
Take-Two, which responded by filing a declaratory judgment action in the Southern District of New
York. See Declaratory Judgment Action, Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc. v. Pinkerton Consulting
& Investigations, Inc., No. 19-cv-338 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2019). In April 2019, Rockstar and TakeTwo dismissed the action, stating that Pinkerton had withdrawn its claims for royalties. See Ryan
Meyer, The Take-Two Interactive v. Pinkerton Showdown Has Ended in a Draw, JDSUPRA (Apr. 25,
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come from Hart and Keller, in which the NCAA’s rules regarding amateurism
at the time meant the plaintiffs’ victories in those cases destroyed NCAA
Football altogether.452
Moreover, the California Court of Appeal acknowledged in de Havilland
that courts have “struggled mightily” to “figure out how to apply” the
transformative use test to expressive works.453 That struggle arises from the
subjectivity of the test, which requires courts to make qualitative judgments
over whether a mark or likeness is sufficiently artistic or creative and
transformed within an expressive work to merit First Amendment
protection.454 In Comedy III, the California Supreme Court played this
subjective role by determining that an artist’s sketch of The Three Stooges on
lithographs and t-shirts did not merit First Amendment protection, while
stating that Andy Warhol’s portraits of celebrities likely would.455 It even
recognized that the distinction between works that are protected by the First
Amendment and those that are not will “sometimes be subtle.”456
As Justice Holmes said more than a century ago, “[i]t would be a
dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the
narrowest and most obvious limits.”457 This principle applies in greater force
today to video games, a newer form of expressive work compared to
traditional entertainment media.458 The subjective transformative use test
might be appropriate in copyright law as one of many factors to determine the
application of a fair use defense, but it is inappropriate for Lanham Act claims
2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-take-two-interactive-v-pinkerton-63564.
452. See NCAA FOOTBALL (Electronic Arts 2013) (final installment of the NCAA Football series).
As Hart explains, NCAA rules did not allow college athletes to accept remuneration or permit the use
of their likenesses to “advertise, recommend or promote directly the sale or use of a commercial
product or service of any kind.” Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 714 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 2013). Thus, EA
could not pay college football players for the right to use their likenesses in any video game. See id.
This topic has been the subject of much discussion, many lawsuits, and even legislative action beyond
the scope of this article. See, e.g., Justin W. Aimonetti & Christian Talley, Game Changer: Why and
How Congress Should Preempt State Student-Athlete Compensation Regimes, 72 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 28, 32 (2019–2020) (addressing “the student-athlete compensation dilemma”).
453. de Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625, 641 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 800 (2019).
454. See Palachuk, supra note 438, at 263–64.
455. Comedy III Prods., Inc., v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 810–11 (Cal. 2001).
456. Id. at 811.
457. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
458. See Kadri, supra note 441, at 1528.
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and right of publicity claims when First Amendment rights are at stake.459
The differences in the results reached by California state courts highlight
the subjectivity of the transformative use test.460 One can argue that the No
Doubt likenesses in Band Hero depicted No Doubt’s members as they
appeared in real life and doing what they did in real life,461 while Ulala in
Space Channel 5 and CJ in San Andreas did not depict Kirby or Washington
as they appeared in real life or doing what they did in real life.462 But that
argument fails when considering Noriega, where the court found the depiction
of Noriega was transformative even though Activision used real life
photographs to create Noriega’s likeness and depicted him in the same role he
served in real life.463 The true difference, it seems, is that the court in No
Doubt simply refused to consider the other expressive elements of Band Hero
and instead focused solely on the depiction of No Doubt.464 The most likely
explanation is that the court believed the game had little value as an expressive
work.
A comparison between No Doubt and de Havilland further illustrates the
problems with the transformative use test. In de Havilland, the court pointed
out that the de Havilland character appears only in 4.2 percent of Feud, which
focuses on the competition between two other characters and includes many
other stories as well.465 The court also found that FX used de Havilland’s
459. See, e.g., Conrad, supra note 429, at 780–83; Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the
Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1187–89 (2006); Volokh,
supra note 327, at 910, 922 (explaining the problems with analogizing the right of publicity to
copyright law and importing the transformative use test from copyright’s fair use analysis to the right
of publicity context).
460. See supra notes 258–312 and accompanying text.
461. No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 401 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)
(explaining how, in Band Hero, players can perform songs using “digital representations of real-life
rock stars”).
462. See Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc. 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 609–610 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (explaining
that Kirby is “the lead singer of a retro-funk dance musical group” and Ulala is an outer space news
reporter who is “dispatched to investigate an invasion of Earth by dance-loving aliens” and must
“match the dance moves of [] other characters”); Washington v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc.,
No. B232929, 2012 WL 5358709, at *11 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2012) (explaining how much CJ and
Washington differ, and how many aspects of CJ’s character have no resemblance or connection to
Washington’s life).
463. Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard, Inc., No. BC 551747, 2014 WL 5930149, *3–4 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Oct. 27, 2014).
464. See No Doubt, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 410–12 (focusing on the depiction of No Doubt in the game
when deciding whether the game is transformative).
465. de Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625, 641 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 800 (2019).
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likeness only as “one of the ‘raw materials’ from which [the] original work is
synthesized,” and that Feud’s marketability and economic value came
“‘principally from . . . the creativity, skill, and reputation’ of Feud’s creators
and actors”—not from de Havilland’s fame.466
The same could be said about the depiction of No Doubt in Band Hero.467
The band members’ likenesses only constituted a small fraction of Band Hero,
a game that focuses on allowing “players to simulate performing in a rock
band in time with popular songs.”468 Even among avatars, Band Hero
included other “fictional characters created and designed by Activision, . . .
digital representations of real-life rock stars” besides No Doubt, and the
ability for players to “design their own unique fictional avatars.”469 And it is
much more likely that Band Hero’s marketability and economic value derived
mainly from its gameplay and Activision’s reputation as a video game
publisher, not from No Doubt’s fame.470 But the court ignored these elements
of Band Hero. Instead, it concluded that “the graphics and other background
content of the game are secondary, and the expressive elements of the game
remain ‘manifestly subordinated to the overall goal of creating a conventional
portrait of [No Doubt] so as to commercially exploit [its] fame.’”471 The court
said that “nothing in the creative elements of the Band Hero elevates the
depictions of No Doubt to something more than ‘conventional, more or less
fungible,’ images of its members that No Doubt should have the right to
control and exploit.”472
Again, the difference between the two cases appears to be the No Doubt
court’s sole focus on the depictions of No Doubt’s likenesses while ignoring
the rest of Band Hero.473 The analyses and results in No Doubt and de
466. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Comedy III Prods., Inc., v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d
797, 809–810 (Cal. 2001)).
467. No Doubt, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 410–12. For a similar perspective on No Doubt but without a
comparison to de Havilland, see So Are Games Coffee Mugs or What?, supra note 21, at 192.
468. No Doubt, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 401.
469. Id.
470. Id. (explaining the gameplay of Band Hero and its immense popularity).
471. Id. at 411 (alterations in original) (quoting Comedy III Prods., Inc., v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21
P.3d 797, 810 (Cal. 2001)).
472. Id. (quoting Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 808).
473. See So Are Games Coffee Mugs or What?, supra note 21, at 192 (“Context matters, except
when it doesn’t. The court treated the transformative test as one that requires some visual change to
the portrayal of the plaintiffs, focusing on the avatars in the game rather than the game as a whole.”).
Compare No Doubt, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 410–11 (analyzing the characterized likeness of No Doubt in
performing “the same activity by which the band achieved and maintains its fame” and merely
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Havilland cannot be reconciled. If the creators of a television series can
portray a real person without acquiring her permission, why can’t the creator
of a video game do so? And why did FX’s use of de Havilland’s likeness in
Feud constitute transformative use,474 but Activision’s use of No Doubt’s
likenesses in Band Hero did not?475 The simplest answer476 can be found in
the courts’ own statements comparing video games not to other expressive
works, but to products and merchandise. In at least four recent cases, courts
have suggested that video games merit less First Amendment protection than
other expressive works.477
First, in de Havilland, the California Court of Appeal distinguished
“expressive works such as films, plays, and television programs” from
“products and merchandise such as T-shirts and lithographs, greeting cards,
and video games, or advertisements for products and merchandise.”478
Second, in Keller, Judge Thomas’s dissent warned that the majority’s opinion
would jeopardize “the creative use of historic figures in motion pictures,
books, and sound recordings,” and “cannot be reconciled with the many cases
affording such works First Amendment protection.”479 The majority
responded that the case before it involved a video game and thus “leaves room
for distinguishing” it from “cases involving other kinds of expressive
works.”480 Third, during the oral argument in Davis, a Ninth Circuit judge
considering the “other background content of the game [as] secondary”), with de Havilland v. FX
Networks, LLC, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625, 641 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 800 (2019)
(considering both de Havilland’s portrayed likeness in the television show and also the “creativity,
skill and reputation” of the show’s creators).
474. de Havilland, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 637–39, 641.
475. No Doubt, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 410–12, 415.
476. See United States v. Santana-Dones, 920 F.3d 70, 83 (1st Cir. 2019) (“The rule of Occam’s
razor teaches that the simplest of competing theories should often be preferred.”).
477. At least one commentator appears to buy into this view, treating video games as having the
same expressive value as sports cards. See Richard T. Karcher, The Use of Players’ Identities in
Fantasy Sports Leagues: Developing Workable Standards for Right of Publicity Claims, 111 PENN.
ST. L. REV. 557, 571 (2007) (arguing that “nobody would suggest that [sports] players should not have
the right to be compensated for the use of their identities in the video game and trading card markets
because there is a legitimate social purpose in preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good will”).
One treatise also places video games in the same category as t-shirts, at least in the title. See Malla
Pollack, Litigating the Right of Publicity: Your Client’s Face Was on the News, Now It’s on T-Shirts
and Video Games, 119 AM. JUR. TRIALS 343 (2011).
478. de Havilland, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 636, 641 (internal citations omitted).
479. Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.),
724 F.3d 1268, 1290 (9th Cir. 2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
480. Id. at 1279 n.10 (majority opinion).
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suggested greeting cards are “at least as expressive as a video game, probably
more so.”481 Fourth, even in Brown v. Electronic Arts, where the Ninth Circuit
suggested that “any evolution” in the application of the First Amendment to
video games merits “greater protection,”482 the court nevertheless went out of
its way to say “Madden NFL is not the expressive equal of Anna Karenina or
Citizen Kane.”483
By contrast, recent statements recognizing video games as equal to other
expressive works, such as the California Court of Appeal’s description of San
Andreas as an “animated, interactive movie,” or Judge Thomas’s description
of NCAA Football as a “work of interactive historical fiction,” are rare and
often appear only in unpublished or dissenting opinions.484 In this sense,
courts have regressed over time, given that one court had found in the early
2000s that video games are entitled to the same First Amendment protection
as paintings, music, literature, and movies.485
The seemingly dominant view that video games are lesser than other
expressive works and are instead comparable with “mundane products”486 or
merchandise such as lithographs, t-shirts, and greeting cards stands in stark
contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court’s recognition that the First Amendment
protects video games just as much as it protects “the protected books, plays,
and movies that preceded them.”487 The lower courts’ failure to properly
categorize video games as expressive works can make all the difference, since
one generally must obtain permission to use marks and likenesses on products
and merchandise, while permission is unnecessary for expressive works.488
The perception of video games as products and merchandise might stem
from a failure to understand that video games today are more complex than
traditional games, such as Chutes & Ladders, or simple games, such as
481. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
482. Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1242 n.3 (9th Cir. 2013).
483. Id. at 1241. This comparison might not have been entirely serious; nevertheless, it gives the
impression that the court believes the expressive value of video games cannot compare to the
expressive value of books and films.
484. Washington v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., No. B232929, 2012 WL 5358709, at *1
(Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2012) (unpublished opinion); Keller, 724 F.3d at 1285 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
485. See Interactive Dig. Software Ass’n v. St. Louis Cty., 329 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 2003).
486. Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1279 (11th Cir. 2012)
(describing “mini-prints, mugs, cups, . . . flags, towels, [and] t-shirts” as “mundane products”).
487. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 U.S. 786, 790 (2011).
488. See So Are Games Coffee Mugs or What?, supra note 21, at 178; Restoring Rogers, supra note
21, at 311–12.
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Pong.489 Even in the 1970s, adventure games such as Zork with characters,
plot, and story much like those seen in books already existed.490 But by now,
in the 21st century, the suggestion that modern video games are products or
merchandise and not expressive works must be rejected as wrong except
perhaps in the rarest of circumstances.491 If the First Amendment protects the
depiction of Olivia de Havilland in Feud and Jeffrey Sarver in The Hurt
Locker,492 it should likewise protect the depiction of Samuel Keller in NCAA
Football and Michael Davis in Madden NFL.493
C. Proposal to Apply the Rogers Test to Both Lanham Act and Right of
Publicity Claims
If a test must be applied at all to right of publicity claims,494 courts should
apply the Rogers test, which strikes the right balance between the First
Amendment, the Lanham Act, and the right of publicity. Courts have
successfully applied the test to Lanham Act claims for more than thirty years
since the Second Circuit decided Rogers in 1989. And the test is well-suited
489. See Ford & Liebler, supra note 21, at 4–5, 40 (describing McCarthy’s suggestion that
“commercially produced games are largely unexpressive and mostly childish” and suggesting Pong’s
“claim as expressive speech is not very compelling”); see also Jon M. Garon, Playing in the Virtual
Arena: Avatars, Publicity, and Identity Reconceptualized Through Virtual Worlds and Computer
Games, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 465, 472–73 (2008) (“[T]he makers of Pong had no point of view being
espoused by their square ball or simple paddles . . . .”) (italics added).
490. See Ford & Liebler, supra note 21, at 57.
491. See Garon, supra note 489, at 472–73 (“[M]odern games can be violent, sexy, propagandistic,
satirical or politically astute. At some point, the authors of these games tapped them for their
expressive ability. The law has slowly followed suit.”) (footnote omitted).
492. See de Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625, 641 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 800 (2019) (holding that FX’s use of de Havilland’s character was transformative
and protected by the First Amendment); see also Sarver v. Chartier, 813 F.3d 891, 905 (9th Cir. 2016)
(holding that The Hurt Locker was “fully protected by the First Amendment”).
493. See Davis v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 775 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2015) (alleging that the defendant
included plaintiff’s likeness “without authorization” in its video game Madden NFL); Keller v. Elec.
Arts, Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268, 1271 (9th
Cir. 2013) (affirming that the defendant’s “literal[] recreat[ion]” of the plaintiff in its video game “does
not qualify for First Amendment protection as a matter of law”). Perhaps an even better comparison
can be made to Dryer v. National Football League, 55 F. Supp. 3d 1181,1204 (D. Minn. 2014), aff’d,
814 F.3d 938 (8th Cir. 2016), where the District of Minnesota dismissed retired football players’ right
of publicity claims against the producers of football films because it found the films were expressive
works and not commercial speech.
494. No balancing test is needed at all. Courts could simply apply the analyses in Guglielmi, de
Havilland, and Sarver, to determine whether a publisher’s use of an individual’s likeness is a disguised
commercial advertisement.
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to the right of publicity context, where it would offer predictability and a less
subjective test that would adequately protect video games as expressive
works.495 The artistic relevance and explicitly misleading prongs of the test
would give publishers the appropriate protection for their games, regardless
of whether they depict real or fictional people, while preventing them from
exploiting likenesses of real people as a disguised commercial
advertisement.496 Assuming states have a legitimate interest in prohibiting
certain unauthorized use of likenesses in expressive works, the Rogers test
appropriately considers that interest without overreaching.497
Nevertheless, a mere proposal to apply the Rogers test is not enough since
courts across the country have applied different versions of the test.498 While
these inconsistencies require resolution, there is no need to overcomplicate
the test. For example, one commentator suggested applying the Rogers test
to right of publicity claims, but instead of analyzing whether the use of the
likeness has artistic relevance, the proposed test would analyze whether the
use has a “distinct expressive purpose.”499 As the commentator noted,
however, that inquiry is still related to the transformative use test.500
Courts should simply apply a clear Rogers test that analyzes whether the
use of the mark or likeness has artistic relevance to the work, and if so,
whether the use explicitly misleads as to the source and content of the work.501
495. See Yeo, supra note 438, at 426; Palachuk, supra note 438, at 259; accord TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 21, § 31:144.50 (“The yes-or-no rule [in the Rogers artistic
relevance analysis] has the benefit of relieving judges of the need to make an artistic evaluation of
how important the use of a trademark is in the defendant’s expressive work.”).
496. See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999 (articulating the artistic prong and explicitly misleading prongs,
and how they work together to protect the creator’s expressive work but not exploit the characters used
for commercial gain); see also Palachuk, supra note 438, at 259 (explaining how the two prongs
analyze “like and likeness” claims while providing broad protection to the creativity of the artistic
work).
497. See Yeo, supra note 438, at 428, 433 (explaining that the artistic relevance prong gives
“overriding weight to the public’s interest in free expression” while the second prong will not allow
the defendant to use First Amendment protection “if the use amounts to an explicit false
endorsement”).
498. See generally Jordan & Kelly, supra note 99, at 834–35 (noting the variety of ways the federal
appellate courts have applied and refined the Rogers test); Restoring Rogers, supra note 21, at 307
(explaining the Second and Ninth Circuits’ expansion upon the original Rogers test); Zangrillo, supra
note 446, at 403–21 (discussing the circuit split that developed over the Rogers test).
499. Yeo, supra note 438, at 431–32.
500. Yeo, supra note 438, at 431.
501. See Palachuk, supra note 438, at 259 (finding that it is advantageous for courts to use the twoprong test and analyze: “(1) whether the individual’s image and likeness is actually used; and (2)
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When applying this test in the right of publicity context, courts can view the
evidence through the lens of whether the use of the name or likeness is
“‘wholly unrelated’ to the content of the work or is ‘simply a disguised
commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or services.’”502 The ultimate
analysis remains roughly the same.503 This formulation of the Rogers test to
right of publicity claims has generally been approved by courts,504
commentators,505 and the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition.506 And
formulated in this way, the test would serve the purpose of trademark rights
to avoid consumer confusion, the purpose of the right of publicity to prohibit
unauthorized commercial misappropriation of an individual’s name or
likeness, and the purpose of the First Amendment to protect expressive works.
The first part of the Rogers test would continue to focus on whether the
use of the mark or likeness has artistic relevance to the underlying work. In
the video game context, this has been and can often be a straightforward
inquiry. As one court recognized, this requirement is “real,” but “not unduly
rigorous” given the potential intrusion upon “First Amendment values.”507
whether the artistic work intentionally or explicitly misleads a consumer as to the source of the work”).
The Rogers test can get complicated when applied to products and merchandise. See Restoring
Rogers, supra note 21, at 311 (noting the complications with the medium of cards as expressive
content). In a case involving the unauthorized use of the Honey Badger trademarks on greeting cards,
the Ninth Circuit identified three additional considerations in analyzing the explicitly misleading
prong: whether consumers would view the mark alone as identifying the source of the expressive work,
the degree to which the user and the mark owner use the marks in the same way, and the extent to
which the user adds its own expressive content to the work beyond the mark itself. Gordon v. Drape
Creative, Inc., 909 F.3d 257, 270 (9th Cir. 2018). Professor Ford discusses greeting cards in Restoring
Rogers, supra note 21, at 311. The considerations stated in Gordon rarely apply in the video game
context and show even more reason to treat video games less like products and merchandise, and more
like other entertainment media. See Restoring Rogers, supra note 21 at 311–12.
502. See Kadri, supra note 441, at 1525–26 (footnote omitted) (quoting Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875
F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989)).
503. See Kadri, supra note 441, at 1530 (stating that even under the Rogers test, “public figures may
still challenge unauthorized use in purely commercial expression” and “it disavows commercial
exploitation through false endorsement”).
504. See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 461 (6th Cir. 2003); Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15
F.3d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1994); Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004; see also Dillinger, LLC v. Elec. Arts, Inc.,
No. 1:09-cv-1236-JMS-DKL, 2011 WL 2457678, at *4 n.1 (S.D. Ind. June 16, 2011) (applying the
Rogers test); Romantics v. Activision Publ’g Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 758, 765–766 (E.D. Mich. 2008)
(recognizing that “[t]he Sixth Circuit applies the Rogers test to Lanham Act claims” and applying the
Rogers test to the case at hand).
505. See Ford & Liebler, supra note 21, at 77–84; Palachuk, supra note 438, at 259.
506. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46, 47 & cmt. c (Am. Law Inst. 1995)
(the Restatement’s exact formulation is different but functionally the same).
507. AM Gen. LLC v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 3d 467, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
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Applied to a right of publicity claim, the First Amendment would protect the
use of a likeness that has artistic relevance to the work but would not protect
the use of the likeness that has no artistic relevance and is “wholly unrelated”
to the work, since it then is “simply a disguised commercial advertisement.”508
The second part of the Rogers test would continue to focus on whether
the use of a mark or likeness explicitly misleads consumers as to the source
or content of the work. Courts should follow the lead of the Sixth and Ninth
Circuits and scrap the likelihood of confusion and alternative means tests.509
In the video game context, the explicitly misleading test would thus primarily
review whether the publisher made an “‘explicit indication,’ ‘overt claim,’ or
‘explicit misstatement’” that would mislead a consumer as to the source or
content of the work.510 This appropriately balances the First Amendment with
trademark law—concerned about consumer confusion—and with the right of
publicity—concerned about the commercial misappropriation of likenesses.
If the use of a name or likeness explicitly misleads as to the source or content
of the work, “it is a disguised commercial advertisement.”511 But if it does
not explicitly mislead, then the First Amendment should protect the use even
though the publisher might benefit financially. This follows longstanding
precedent that the First Amendment protects expressive works regardless of
whether those works are for profit.512
The Eastern District of Michigan’s decision in Romantics serves as a
prime example of the proper application of the Rogers test to a right of
publicity claim.513 After finding that Rocks the 80s was an expressive work
protected by the First Amendment, the court disposed of The Romantics’ right
of publicity claim.514 Because “the purpose of [Rocks the 80s] is to allow
players to pretend they are in a rock band,” Activision’s use of the song was
“not wholly unrelated to the content of the work.”515 And because the song
and The Romantics were not referenced in advertising materials, and one
508. See Kadri, supra note 441, at 1525 (quoting Rogers v.Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir.
1989)).
509. See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 447–52 (6th Cir. 2003); Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc.,
724 F.3d 1235, 1241–42 (9th Cir. 2013).
510. Brown, 724 F.3d at 1245 (quoting Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1001).
511. See Kadri, supra note 441, at 1525–26.
512. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text.
513. See Romantics v. Activision Publ’g Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 758 (E.D. Mich. 2008); see also
supra notes 175–186 and accompanying text (discussing Romantics).
514. Romantics, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 766.
515. Id.
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could “play [Rocks the 80s] and never encounter the [s]ong,” it was not a
“disguised commercial advertisement.”516 The court’s straightforward
analysis appropriately balanced the First Amendment’s protection of Rocks
the 80s and The Romantics’ commercial interest in their likenesses.
Three final examples illustrate the potential application of this test to right
of publicity cases. In Parks v. LaFace Records,517 the Sixth Circuit found
genuine issues of material fact as to whether OutKast’s use of Rosa Parks’s
name as the title of a song that had “nothing to do with Parks” or her civil
rights activities lacked artistic relevance and as to whether the song’s title was
“wholly unrelated” to its content.518 It concluded reasonable people “could
find the title to be a ‘disguised commercial advertisement’ or adopted ‘solely
to attract attention’ to the work.”519 In Brown v. Electronic Arts, the Ninth
Circuit’s hypothetical example of former NFL player Jim Brown’s name or
likeness in a game called “Jim Brown Presents Pinball with no relation to Jim
Brown or football beyond the title” might lack artistic relevance.520
Presumably, such a use would also be wholly unrelated to the work. And in
Guglielmi, the California Supreme Court gave the hypothetical example of the
defendants publishing “Rudolph Valentino’s Cookbook” where “neither the
recipes nor the menus described in the book were in any fashion related to
Rudolph Valentino.”521
VI. CONCLUSION
This article’s review of cases involving the Lanham Act and the right of
publicity in the video game context has revealed at least two necessary
changes. First, it is beyond time for courts to apply the U.S. Supreme Court’s
teaching in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n and recognize video
games as expressive works equal to traditional entertainment media instead of
comparing them to mundane products and merchandise. Second, the
transformative use test has failed to adequately apply First Amendment
protection to video games, and courts should instead apply the Rogers test to
both Lanham Act and right of publicity claims. By making these two changes,
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.
521.
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video games might finally receive the First Amendment protection they
deserve.
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